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Abstract
The Army is concerned with maintaining safe operations in light of increasing operational demands. The Army Safety Center's goal, as approved by the Under Secretary
of Defense for Acquisitions and Technology, is to reduce accident severity by 50% in the
next decade. The Safety Center chartered the Aviation Safety Investment Strategy Team
to evaluate accidents to determine their hazards, or contributing conditions, and their
controls, or reduction measures. This study specifically targets these force-modernized
aircraft: AH-64 Apache, CH/MH-47 Chinook, OH-58D Kiowa Warrior, and UH-60 Black
Hawk.

This research takes a look at selecting the best portfolios of controls to minimize
aviation accident severity. The accidents are simulated using Monte Carlo techniques.
Value-Focused Thinking techniques evaluate the severity of accidents generated by the
simulation. The optimization is approached using a knapsack heuristic. Insights into
selecting the best sets of controls aid decision makers when determining the portfolios
with the best Percent Severity Reduction given budget considerations.
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SELECTING OPTIMAL CONTROL PORTFOLIOS
TO IMPROVE ARMY AVIATION SAFETY

/. Introduction
By law, The Army is tasked to defend the United States and its territories; support national policies and objectives; and defeat nations responsible for aggression that
endanger the peace and security of the United States (33). Accomplishing this goal, while
minimizing the cost to its soldiers and to civilians, requires that commanders account for
risk when making decisions. Conscientious soldiers and leaders plan for uncertain hazards
and seek to eliminate accidents both during times of peace, as well as in combat. Because
accidents have historically killed more soldiers than enemy fire, and these losses take their
toll on effectiveness, morale and mission-readiness, this issue cannot be ignored.

Identi-

fying, assessing, and controlling these risks is the purpose of the risk management process
(8:1-1,2).

The Under-Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology admonished

the services to "...achieve a three sigma reduction in Class A accident rate in five years"
(13).

The Army recognizes the significance of risk management; consequently, the Army

relies on the U.S. Army Safety Center (USASC) to maintain the Risk Management Information System, as well as all Army accident information, and evaluate safety-control
related issues.
The number of Army aviation mishaps have increased in the past decade, attracting
public attention and demanding reasonable solutions.

Increasing mission frequency and

complexity compounded by decreasing resources may have contributed significantly to this
rise in accidents. As the ops-tempo increases, more attention must be directed toward the
hazards, the system inadequacies contributing to accidents.
The Army has chosen to address its aviation hazards and controls through the formation of the Aviation Safety Investment Strategy Team (ASIST), a group of safety and
aviation experts who analyzed accident investigation information and identified potential
hazards and the controls that reduce them (13:1).
1-1

ASIST proposed a strategy that the

Army Vice Chief of Staff endorsed in April 1999: to reduce the total annual cost of aviation
accidents; to reduce the rate of fatal and disabling injuries; and to decrease the accident
rate, all by 50% in the next decade.

Since the establishment of this strategy, several

aircraft have been analyzed and the accident rate for FY00 is 15.9% less than FY99 (34).
Nonetheless, meeting the 50% reduction goal across the board is ambitious and requires
proper analyses.

Risk Management enables the development, fielding, and employment

of the Total Army Force.

Five steps have been identified to conduct an adequate risk

management program (8:2-0):
Step 1: Identify hazards
Step 2: Assess hazards to determine risks
Step 3: Develop controls to make risk decisions
Step 4: Implement controls
Step 5: Supervise and evaluate
ASIST has and will continue to successfully complete steps 1, 2 and 3 for each
individual airframe.

Step 3 can be broken into two parts, developing the controls and

making the risk decisions. The best controls have been suggested by ASIST; this research
focuses on the best sets of controls, or portfolios of controls, for the Army to select.
Risk management enhances the decision making process by providing the information
required to make informed decisions and to identify control measures in areas that lack
specific standards.

Supplementing decision making resources, risk management enables

a decision maker to provide reasonable, defensible alternatives (8:1-4).

The concept of

Value-Focused Thinking (VFT) can be brought to bear on this problem, VFT applies the
foundational ideas of risk management, addressing first what is important and secondly
how to achieve it.

A VFT approach puts responsibility for identifying important values

in the hands of the leaders; who feel ownership and are able to defend and trust solutions
based on their voiced preferences (18:92)
For two years the USASC has seen benefit from AFIT research; Sperling's VFT study
and initial value model inspired USASC, in part, to form ASIST (30). Gallan contributed
the improved Severity of Losses model to the effort (13).
1-2

The research described herein

follows on those efforts, addressing the selection of an optimal region for portfolios of controls given certain constraints, such as available budget. A systematic way of evaluating
the effectiveness of an individual control or a set of controls was established and accepted,
but selecting an optimal set of controls has not been done previously. Using integer programming and a direct-search driven knapsack approach, an optimal region for selecting
portfolios of controls is identified. Given the inherent uncertainty, coupled with the combinatorial size of the problem, this heuristic-based method identifies the region for multiple,
feasible, reliable results leading to relevant insights into the system, aiding decision makers
at the Safety Center.

1.1

Background
Meeting the operational demands of mission readiness while keeping up with tech-

nological advances in the evolving environment faced by today's Army requires constant
vigilance and effective safety analysis. With a strong foundation in Army Field Manual
100-14, the Army approaches safety from a risk management viewpoint. In this context,
risk management is a process for making decisions that minimize the risks and severity of
danger to soldiers and the mission (8). A hazard is defined as an actual or potential condition that can cause injury, illness, or death of personnel, loss of equipment, property or
mission degradation. Severity measures the expected consequence of an event (hazardous
incident) in terms of degree of injury, property damage, or other mission impairing factors
that could occur. Risk is defined as the chance of a hazard or negative consequence; risk
level is expressed in terms of hazard probability and severity (8:G-3).

ASIST's hazard

taxonomy, a breakdown of what hazards played a part in each recorded accident, improved
the accident database by clarifying hazards, controls and identifying their interactions.
Accepted as the model that captured decision-makers' values, the value model quantifies the severity of losses resulting from accidents for 100,000 flying hours for any given
set of accident cases.

Unlike traditional value-focused thinking where 0 is the least de-

sirable and 1 is highly desirable, the model quantifies severity, therefore, a reduction of
severity is always preferred.

The Severity of Losses values are calculated from accident

data on the three most severe classes of accidents: class A, any fatalities or cost over $1
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million; class B, severe injuries or cost between $200,000 and $1 million; and class C, minor injuries or cost between $10,000 and $200,000.

A Monte Carlo-based bootstrapping

simulation returns expected levels of severity reduction for blocks of 100,000 flight hours.
The Severity Reduction for a given control is equal to the percent difference between the
expected Severity of Losses with no controls applied and the expected Severity of Losses
with the selected controls. The portfolio optimization uses these effectiveness levels and
the estimated cost for each control to indicate relative performance.

1.2

Problem Statement & Methodology
This research expands the Severity of Losses model to include all ASIST documented

aircraft, proposes methodology to incorporate the remaining hazards, and formulates an
optimization tool suited for portfolio selection of controls. Hazards are system inadequacies
that contribute to an accident occurring or its severity. Controls are measures that counter
hazards and reduce the occurrence or severity of accidents. The focus of this research is
on presenting a methodology and a working prototype to integrate multiple systems; the
USASC leadership can benefit from the latter insights by implementing these methods in
all aspects of safety that are categorized into controls and hazards. Figure 1.1 shows how
a single airframe fits into the hierarchy of loss contribution. A UH-60 accident contributes
to the overall accident rate in rotary wing aircraft, in Army aviation, and the Army as a
whole. The goal is to reduce accident severity at the Army level.
The primary aspects of the research are developed separately: the multiattribute
value hierarchy, the bootstrap statistics using Monte Carlo simulation, and the portfolio
optimization model. The multiattribute value hierarchy, based on the Army's Risk Management field manual, is modified using Value-Focused Thinking methods first proposed
by Keeney and expanded by Kirkwood. As a solid framework has already been established
by Sperling and Gallan, this expanded hierarchy focuses on assessing Army level versus
battalion level values and their weights. This new Severity of Losses model integrates additional aircraft as well as identifies and analyzes hazards consistently, providing necessary
insights to senior leadership. The results influence the selection of portfolios of controls
that provide the most reduction in losses for given budget levels.
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Figure 1.1

Scope of the Study

Assuming the validity of the Severity of Losses model developed by Gallan, the first
step in developing a robust, expanded model was to integrate the new accident data into
a single data set. Developing the Simulation to account for multiple systems, in this case
airframes, involved updating measure ranges to include new observations.

This study

considers the intent and expected use of this tool by decision makers when basing all
severity scores on the preferences of experts and leadership.
Once the model was developed to produce an expected reduction in severity for any
given trial portfolio, the search for a best portfolio began.
approached many different ways.

Portfolio selection may be

Traditionally, decision analysts approach portfolio se-

lection, also known as resource allocation, by ratio methods. Another reasonable approach
to this mathematical program was found in the knapsack problem, which also accounts
for resources (22).

Exploration of derivative-free optimization methods fall into a cate-

gory called direct search methods. These interesting and applicable algorithms efficiently
search regions proceeding to new points based upon improvement in an observed objective
value (32).
Focusing on the Army's goal, each portfolio may contain a control from any system
under study.

If a specific portfolio can eliminate all of the accidents for one aircraft,
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the Army's overall accident rate may drop only slightly. The Army desires to reduce the
accident severity across the board, not just for one aircraft. Consequently, all aircraft cases
must be aggregated and analyzed, their hazards noted, and controls selected to achieve
a significant drop in losses, and ultimately, the overall Army accident severity.

The

integrated methodology addressed in this study provides an acceptable level of reduction
in losses for the Army while it remains within a designated budget limitation.
The data used comes directly from the ASIST database managed by the U.S. Army
Safety Center, Fort Rucker, AL. ASIST, the Aviation Safety Investment Strategy Team,
developed the hazard taxonomy and controls.

This research takes and develops an op-

timization strategy for the aircraft, as a whole, that ASIST has analyzed to date.

This

includes the UH-60 Black Hawk, AH-64 Apache, CH-47D Chinook, and OH-58D Kiowa
Warrior. Due to the massive amount of excellent analysis done by ASIST, all of the data
needed for this research is available and has been provided by USASC/ORSA.

Incor-

porating this data and implementing the methodology utilizes several software packages:
Microsoft Access, Microsoft Excel, Frontline Premium Solver Platform, and Palisade's
©RISK. The methodology integrates these packages to make use of specific capabilities of
each.

1.3

An Overview of Subsequent Chapters
This research combines decision analysis, simulation, and optimization to yield a spe-

cialized methodology providing unique insights and practical applications.

Chapter Two

discusses the literature pertinent to this study including decision analysis methods, Monte
Carlo simulation techniques, portfolio selection, integer programming, and simulation optimization. The complete methodology is contained in Chapter Three; it implements the
data on the multiple airframes and searches for the best portfolios of controls to meet the
goal of 50% reduction in severity. Chapter Four discusses the results of applying the ASIST
data to the methodology and also provides insight into the interactions driving portfolio
selection.

In addition, sensitivity analysis of the results provides significant insights to

whether high levels of accident reduction are possible, reasonable, or affordable. Final recommendations, insights and conclusions appear in Chapter Five; this discussion suggests
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improvements to the data, and recommends guidelines for selecting tractable portfolios.
This thesis effort concludes with a discussion of recommendations to be made for the Army,
the Air Force, and the FAA with regards to this study.

1-7

II. Literature Review
2.1

Introduction
This chapter first introduces the reader to decision analysis and optimization tech-

niques. The discussion on decision analysis addresses Value-Focused Thinking. A Monte
Carlo simulation application of the bootstrap method is explained. Finally, an introduction to mathematical programming follows, discussing integer programming, the knapsack
heuristic, and direct search methods, showing how they can be combined with the simulation model.

2.2

Decision Analysis
2.2.1

Foundational Concepts.

Decision analysis is a prescriptive approach to

help rational people make difficult decisions (4:3).

This methodology helps the decision

maker to model the decision area and to integrate the structure of the problem with their
preferences and beliefs. When facing a decision, every decision maker tries to choose the
alternative that will achieve the best outcome. An outcome is the product of the decision
made and the chance involved given an uncertain payoff, or future outcome.

Because

the uncertainty cannot be controlled, rigorous calculations and analyses are conducted to
submit a thorough foundation for making a good decision.

In-depth studies may seem

unnecessary for some problems; easy decisions need not be subject to this rigorous analysis.
The intent of decision analysis techniques is to provide a framework for approaching hard
decisions (4:3).
Decision analysis fundamentally aids a decision-maker by providing insight into the
uncertainties, trade-offs, and objectives of a problem (4:4).

At most, decision analysis

provides a recommended course of action, but, in no way takes the authority of decision
making from the leadership. It does not compete with a decision-maker's intuition or take
away their obligation to decide, rather, it is simply a valuable tool to help them understand
their problem more clearly and make a better decision (4:4).
An analysis of this type is not purely objective. Decision analysis requires personal
input from experts.

These subjective judgements are a key ingredient for making good
2-1

decisions.

Understanding human inconsistencies is necessary to carefully apply good

techniques and recommend improved decisions (4:5).
For a decision-maker to stand behind a decision of theirs, they must understand the
decision analysis process and trust the underlying values and objectives they have provided.
The first step in this process is to clearly define the problem.

Although this may seem

to be a simple task, a superficial problem, or the question initially asked, may mask the
fundamental issue and may make finding a clear definition difficult. The following steps
describe a method to help clarify decisions using Value-Focused Thinking.
2.2.2

Value-Focused Thinking.

Value-focused thinking techniques boast exten-

sive use across the public and private sectors of our economy. Focusing attention on the
important objectives of a decision maker and not the possible alternatives, value-focused
thinking (VFT) techniques provide clear methods to evaluate alternatives. The development of value models by area experts and knowledgeable decision makers give a consistent
standard by which to measure all alternatives (18). A formal diagram, or model, represents at different tiers the values that are important to a decision maker with regard to
the particular issue at hand. Its purpose is to determine how to measure significant issues
and evaluate alternatives with respect to the "important things" (19:11).
The multiple objective value model (as in Figure 2.1) consists of a fundamental objective, evaluation considerations, objectives, and evaluation measures. The fundamental
objective simply describes the overarching goal. An example may be selecting a new car.
The evaluation measures, or criteria, are the important factors that explain what is meant
specifically by the fundamental objective. For this example, the evaluation measures could
be speed, safety, and style.
ations.

Objectives specify a preference for the evaluation consider-

A faster, safer, more sleek design is most desirable to some, while a moderate

speed vehicle that is very safe and slightly "boxy" might be the most desirable to others.
As is obvious with the example, the objectives are dependent upon the decision maker.
Sub-objectives will likely exist for more detailed models. Evaluation measures constitute
the lowest tier of the value model. These measures scale the degree to which an alternative
attains desirable objectives (19:12). When navigating through the tiers, moving to a lower
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Fundamental
Objective
I
Evaluation
Consideration 2
I
Objective 1

Evaluation
Consideration 2

Objective 2

I
Evaluation
Consideration 3
I
Objective 3

Evaluation
Measure 2

Figure 2.1

Multiple-Objective Value Model

tier requires answering "why is this (the current objective) important?" Moving to higher
tiers answers the question "what do you mean by that (the current lower measure)?" (27).
The Value Model consists of a qualitative part and a quantitative part. The qualitative part is the value hierarchy, similar to the general picture in Figure 2.1. Information
that makes up the values, objectives, and measures comes directly from field experts, documents and doctrine, shareholders in the decision process, and any individuals knowledgeable about and interested in the decision.

The quantitative part consists of the scoring

functions used at the evaluation measure tier and the weights specified for all tiers the
model.
Value hierarchies must meet certain criteria: they must be complete, nonredundant,
and independent. The first two properties are often referred to as mutually exclusive and
collectively exhaustive. When two objectives are mutually exclusive, they address unique
items of importance, without overlap. Likewise, a set of collectively exhaustive objectives
ensure coverage of all relevant issues of importance. The evaluation measures must adhere
to the property of independence.

This means that the value of a certain level of one

measure must not be dependent on the level of a different evaluation measure (27:2.6).
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Each evaluation measure uses data to evaluate how well each alternative performs
with respect to the objective; the analyst must decide, with the decision makers, what data
is most representative of the objectives being attained. Scales for evaluation measures are
categorized as natural or constructed to identify how clearly the scale may be interpreted,
and the measures are also categorized as direct or proxy to identify how the scale represents
the objective. Identifying types of scoring functions enables decision makers and analysts
to simply explain how the data represents the objective. The following specific descriptions
and examples illustrate the most desirable types of scales for evaluation measures (19:24).
A natural scale is commonly used and is easily interpreted by most everyone. Profit
in dollars is a natural scale that may be used to evaluate a business decision. A constructed
scale is often developed with a certain decision in mind; often characterized by categories,
a constructed scale measures the attainment of a particular alternative.

This type of

scale may be appropriate where a natural scale is infeasible. The performance evaluation
categories of a selected group are constructed scales (19:24)(27:2.25).
The direct scale measures the degree of attainment of the objective. A proxy scale
measures the degree of attainment of an associated objective. For example, "probability
of kill" directly evaluates an objective Kill Likelihood.

Whereas, "student grades" are a

proxy measure for the attainment of the associated objective of student learning (19:24)
(27:2.25).
Table 2.1

Classification of evaluation measures

Direct
Proxy

Natural

Constructed

1
3

2
4

These combinations of classification methods for the evaluation measures create four
possible combinations of scale types, and as the analyst seeks obtain the most accurate
and representative hard data available, the categories are ranked by preference in Table
2.1.

Natural-proxy scales, preference 3, and natural-direct scales, preference 1, have the

benefit of a pre-established axis for measurement. Any constructed scale takes significant
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time to establish and verify.

Selection of appropriate scales always depends on the most

fitting measure, however, it may also depend on the data available to the decision maker.
After identifying the scale, a value function quantifies each observation's attainment
of the objective on a 0-1 scale.

The most desirable level receives a value of 1.0 and the

least desirable level receives a 0.0 value. The intermediate values are determined by asking
the preferences of the decision maker and obtaining uncertainties inherent in the measure.
Every evaluation measure has an important part in the final evaluation of the fundamental
objective and each step of the process must be carefully evaluated and documented to
ensure future users are able to unambiguously assign consistent values (19:28).
The final step in developing a value hierarchy requires quantifying the relative importance of objectives occupying the same tier. Experts recommend ranking and comparing
the extremes of evaluation measure scales using swing weighting (19:64).

This method

consistently evaluates the relative importance between increments in value, assuming some
preference between objectives. Finally, once alternatives are scored with regard to the fundamental objective, varying the weights reveal the sensitivity and provide insight about
the alternatives.

2.3

Simulation Techniques
2.3.1

The Bootstrap Method.

First published by Efron in 1979, the bootstrap

method is a powerful non-parametric method for obtaining an estimator's accuracy when
data is limited, specifically providing reliable measures of uncertainty such as standard
errors and confidence intervals. Bootstrapping empirically generates a statistic's distribution. Using a Monte-Carlo resampling simulation, the bootstrapping technique statistically
samples and analyzes data from an unknown distribution, generating the statistic's distribution (36). Standard error is the most common measure of an estimator's accuracy; this
measure is often difficult to obtain due to unobservable samples. A sound approximation
of the numerical value of sep(6*) is computationally possible using the bootstrap method
(11:47).

The name for the bootstrap method originates from the fictional Baron Mun-

chausen, who, after falling to the bottom of a lake, pulled himself out by his bootstraps.
The name helps explain the technique; sampling from the collected data and evaluating the
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resulting data sets reduces the sampling error (5:3). As with any estimation, the standard
error must be calculated, and the smallest error possible is desired.
To gather important statistics from empirical data, the bootstrap method draws random samples, with replacement, to generate those statistics. This method is particularly
useful in situations where no well-defined probability distribution is available.

The pri-

mary advantages of using this method include its simplicity of explanation and calculation,
and the absence of distribution assumptions (11:160). The most significant drawing factor
for this research is that for complex situations, as with computationally difficult statistics,
Monte Carlo samples may be used to approximate the parameters of interest, namely the
mean and its corresponding confidence interval (11:1).
While only a small number of bootstrap replications may be required to estimate
the standard error, an additional factor of ten replications is necessary to calculate the
bootstrap confidence interval (11:15, 52).

Since the re-sampling is from from limited

data, the key sensitivities of the bootstrap method are similar to all statistical analyses;
particular attention must be paid to confirm correct experimental design, data analysis,
and especially correct presentation of conclusions (5:4).
2.3.2

Monte Carlo Simulation.

Monte Carlo simulation generates the input

statistics in a way that is analogous to actual observations. The Monte Carlo samples from
this simulation are used for the bootstrap data samples. Often this ability to systematically
vary inputs provides valuable information that observations cannot supply.

The goal of

Monte Carlo simulation is to exploit theoretical mathematics while avoiding the risks of
large variance by replacing theory with actual experimental data where applicable (15:4).
Random input selections, when carefully managed, can aid in decreasing the associated
variance within the system. One approach is to use real observations and data wherever
practical.

However, this introduces another limitation: the study infers that all possible

occurrences are in the database, a fact often known to be incorrect. The output statistics
associated with this simulation, as well as any, are only as accurate as the observational
data upon which it is based (15:4).
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The expected outcome of a value model that contains uncertainty can be estimated
using Monte Carlo simulation.

Random number generation is the enabler of this tool.

Every uncertainty that influences the system has an underlying probability distribution
function.

By drawing random numbers from these distributions, the data manipulation

within the program generates a single-value outcome. Repeating this trial n independent
times gives reliable data from which to statistically analyze and draw conclusions (4).
Currently, many tools exist to implement Monte Carlo simulation; the application
of choice for this study is ©RISK, add-in software by Palisade for Microsoft Excel. This
package allows the user to uniquely model any system with built-in probability distributions. As a simulation progresses, each iteration generates new possible outcomes. ©RISK
keeps track of the output values and generates a distribution of possible outcomes from
all the observations. This distribution is created by taking all the possible output values,
analyzing them and calculating statistics on their minimum-maximum range (25:51). It
reports the summary statistics upon termination of the experiment. Microsoft Excel and
Palisade's ©RISK enable the Severity of Losses calculations and projections in this project.
2.3.3

Probability Theory.

correct inputs.

Useful simulations and statistical inferences rely on

Monte Carlo simulation uses uniformly distributed random variables as

the foundation for its application.

In addition, a specific input may be based on em-

pirical data, entering the system in the form of random number variates from a specified
distribution. To return an integer value, the set of possible distributions becomes significantly smaller.

Often in practice, interarrival rates are represented using an exponential

distribution (20:390).
Poisson processes maintain properties that account for random occurrences over time
(20:390). Because it can be shown that interarrival, or inter-occurrence, rates of accidents
follow an exponential distribution, the next appropriate step in modeling accidents for a
given time period is to use a Poisson process. A stochastic process {N(t), t > 0)} may be
labeled a Poisson process if it adheres to the following properties (11:160):

1. Events occur one at a time.
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2. The number of events occurring in any interval (t, t+s), is independent of the number
of events occurring before time t.
3. The distribution of the number of events occurring in any interval of length s is
independent of what time t the interval begins.
An assessment of how accident occurrences meet these properties appears in Chapter Three.
2.3-4

Applications of Simulation Techniques in Current Literature.

Utilizing

simulation in conjunction with the bootstrap method is explored in work by Hurry, in an
application determining the impact of Programmed Depot Maintenance on weapon system
availability.

His work supports independent sampling, with replacement, from empirical

distributions. This analysis produced estimates on time to failure and downtime following
a failure; the results of this study confirmed conclusions from previous analyses (17).

2.4

Optimization Techniques
Although there are accepted portfolio selection heuristics within the decision analysis

community, the most robust methods recommend the use of 0-1 linear programming for
finding portfolios with the highest value (19:207). These resource allocation methods use
ratios, cumulative cost, or cumulative benefit to select variables. The available heuristics
provide acceptable, reasonable solutions for extremely small sets, or large sets where precision is not necessary. With the expanding capabilities of hardware and software, however,
larger and more complicated integer programs are now significantly easier to solve than
when these methods were first discovered and used.
There are several types of formulation methods that utilize integer programming
techniques. Seeking to find an optimal solution, simplicity drives the program formulation.
If the problem proves to be NP-hard with intractable solutions, then appropriate heuristics
may be used to approximately solve the problem.

This section addresses the pertinent

literature describing techniques used to optimize problems with characteristics similar to
the portfolio selection problem addressed in this study.
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2.4-1

Knapsack Problems.

This type of problem is of particular interest because it

suggests attaining the most benefit possible by selecting items that, given a limited amount
of space, each contribute a certain amount of benefit. Similar to a hiker's knapsack, the
problem name suggests getting the most benefit for the specified amount of weight or space
a knapsack can hold.

Often, this type of problem allocates a budget, as the knapsack,

and accepts as many projects as possible to maximize benefits. The general mathematical
definition of the knapsack problem is:
Maximize
z = {bx|Wx<c,:re(0,l)}

where bj = benefit from item j; W = weights of items; and c is the cost of the maximum
size of items allowed, such as a budget. The decision variables, Xi, are at least integer
but most likely binary, indicating that each item will either be included in the knapsack,
Xi = 1, or left out of the knapsack, Xi = 0. The classic knapsack problem is characterized
by the single constraint that often acts as a capacity constraint (maximization problem)
or a lower bound on benefit (minimization problem).
The knapsack problem is a traditional method of exact algorithms to small scale
portfolio optimization, or resource allocation, problems (22:14). There are many methods
to solve this type of program; however, this research focuses on the formulation guidance
from this problem, not its specific solution methods.
2.4.2

Direct Search Methods.

When seeking to optimize a system, one must be

aware of system characteristics, such as non-differentiability, that may limit the practical
applications of common optimization tools.

When designed experiments may be per-

formed, but the function is not differentiable, direct search methods provide convergent
optimal, to within a pre-set tolerance, solutions. Hooke and Jeeves first proposed this solution technique in 1961 defining it as a "sequential examination of trial solutions involving
comparison of each trial solution with the 'best' obtained up to that time together with a
strategy for determining what the next trial solution will be" (16:212). The distinguishing
characteristics of direct search include the ability to address problems unsuccessfully solved
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by classical methods, a reduced solution time for problems able to be solved by classical
methods, an algorithm ideally applied on a computer, a continually improving solution set,
and an ability to apply different assumptions.

Simply described, direct search selects a

base point and a second point, these are compared, the best selected, and a new basis is
selected to obtain the next value for evaluation (26).
Why use direct search methods when more modern methods are now available?
There are unique features of direct search that elude the problem of more sophisticated
methods (21:2).
2.4.2.1

Pattern Search.

Pattern search is a specific strategy for the direct

search method that is characterized by its particular search strategy.
pattern search methods currently being used and researched.
rithms work on systems with continuous variables.

There are many

Most pattern search algo-

Often when using pattern search for

R&D designs, the variables are discrete. The pattern search strategy is accomplished by
systematically evaluating local ranges of the variables and either accepting a new solution
based on a better result, or rejecting the solution based on its inferior solution.
2.4.2.2

General Pattern Search Algorithm.

The general algorithm for pat-

tern search consists of the variables Xj, incremental step sizes e for each Xi, and an assumption that past successful strategies will be successful in the future. It is this assumption
that drives the two types of moves, exploratory moves and search moves. The procedure
is as follows (14:113).

Begin computation by selecting an initial, feasible exploratory

point; the method by which this point is selected may provide a quicker solution, but any
feasible point will do.

Evaluate the objective function at this point X\.

Xi ± e to obtain the an objective value for y(X{).

Next evaluate

If there is improvement, that is, if

y(xi±e,X2,x3, ...xn) > y(xi,X2,xs, ...xn) for a maximization problem, then this move was
deemed a success and the xx ± e should be kept and the next Xj tried. Sequentially, all the
independent variables are perturbed with respect to their shown improvement. The end
of this sequence of moves establishes a base point, which is denoted Xi. Next, providing
that the exploratory move produced some improvement, a pattern move is made to arrive
at X%-

Once the exploration at this point produces X2, an extrapolation of base points

2-10

Xi and X2 provides X%. This process of "explore-and-extrapolate" is continued until no
improvement is found.

At that point, reduce all the e by a constant factor and explore

within a smaller region to obtain small improvements. If success is found, explore again,
else reduce e. The stopping criteria is a predefined minimal e value (14:114-5).
Pattern search methods were initially used for continuous variables; however, this is
often not the case in design projects, and discrete variables must be used.

Booker et. cd.

discusses a helicopter blade design in (3:5).
2.4.3 Knapsack Search Heuristic.

The multiple zero-one multiple knapsack

heuristic proposed by Pirkul provides a satisfactory method for solving problems too large
to be solved by optimal solution procedures.

As the knapsack problem has been used

to successfully model resource allocation, capital-budgeting, and other decision-making
processes, so this procedure enables one to find a timely solution or at least a good base
solution for an implicit enumeration method (29:161). Pirkul's problem involves the optimal solutions for problems with multiple knapsacks, but it is easily simplified to a problem
with one resource constraint. Future efforts that combine multiple Army systems should
take note of the multiple knapsack application. Noting successful use of "bang-for-buck"
ratios, a ranked list aids in selecting variables to set equal one in the solution by simply
evaluating the ratio of the objective function coefficient to the coefficient of the resource
constraint, the benefit-cost ratio.

The general approach selects the variables with the

greatest h/ci ratio, or the greatest likelihood of marginal benefit, to add to the objective
function.
The formal heuristic procedure modified for a single portfolio is as follows.
calculate the bi/ci ratios and sort all choices i in decreasing order.

First,

Next, fix variables

equal to 1 based on order in the first step, and pay particular attention to not violating
constraints. The base feasible solution is denoted x.

Finally, for each variable that is

equal to 1 in x, fix that variable to 1 and repeat the previous step to use the remainder of
the resources and generate a new trial solution.

For each base solution, there will be an

associated number of trial solutions that equal the number of variables selected in the base
solution.

Following a single base solution, the best trial solution becomes the next base
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point for a search. These iterative search regions continue until the predefined minimum
improvement between variables has been reached (29:165).
This heuristic is very applicable to this study in that the traditional knapsack problem
could not be implemented because of unavailable objective function coefficients.

Direct

search procedures for zero-one problems have not been clearly set nor proven to converge
unlike the related direct search integer program (32). This heuristic allows for adjustment
without violating assumptions of the method.

It enables the calculation of acceptable

answers to problems that the knapsack problem and the direct search procedure pose. In
the future, development of a direct search procedure for zero-one problems will likely be
published, and this technique should be first examined.
2.4.4

Optimization Summary.

The technique for systematically examining port-

folios integrates the output of the simulation model and the modified direct search techniques to recommend regions of acceptable response. Operationally, the Army addressed
these issues using intuition and qualitative assessments. This methodology allows the decision maker to make qualitative assessments from the resulting quantitatively developed
portfolios.
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III. Methodology
3.1

Overview
This chapter discusses the methodology that was used to select the optimal set of

controls to reduce the cost of accidents, the number of casualties, and the accident rate.
The analysis can be divided into two sections: first, the Severity Reduction simulation
which includes the Severity of Losses value model and second, the mathematical portfolio
optimization program.

3.2

An explanation of the Severity Reduction Simulation.
The purpose of the severity reduction simulation is to produce the expected reduction

in severity over 100,000 flight hours when a specific portfolio of controls is applied. One
hundred thousand flight hours is the aviation standard measure for calculating accident
rates. The percent difference between the expected severity for a portfolio with no controls
applied and the portfolio with certain selected controls applied defines the reduction in
severity.

A single iteration of the simulation calculates the severity of the accidents

selected for 100,000 flight hours as a specific portfolio is applied.

The expected severity

is obtained by completing multiple iterations, each calculating the severity for the given
portfolio.
Monte Carlo simulation techniques are used to generate a number of possible accidents to select from the sample data to simulate a single 100,000 flight hour block. Reference to an iteration indicates a simulated set of accidents for five years worth of 100,000
flight hours blocks and the resulting severity, given the application of a specific portfolio of
controls. The next sections describe necessary elements of the simulation in more detail.
3.2.1

ASIST Database.

The Army Safety Center initiated the meeting of avia-

tion industry and miliary experts to analyze accident data.

This group of experts, the

Aviation Safety Investment Strategy Team, ASIST, met to identify hazards causing individual accidents and address the possible controls that may be applied to reduce the
likelihood or severity of the accident. Because the objective of the analysis was to take a
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risk-based approach rather than a mistake-based or blame-focused look at accidents, the
resulting information focuses on prevention (35:2000). Days of analysis by subject matter
experts resulted in an extremely useful, focused set of accident cases.

This foundational

set of actual accidents included accident data, the hazards affecting these accidents, and
the associated controls that reduce the effect of hazards.

This database supports every

part of the simulation.
3.2.1.1

Hazards.

ASIST chose to set their focus on identifying hazards,

not on identifying cause factors for specific accidents. A hazard is any factor contributing
to the probability or severity of an accident.
from identifying causes.

Defining hazards is significantly different

The distinction involves the focus of the analysis: hazards are

prevention focused, while causes are blame focused.

Analysis often emphasizes mistakes

when identifying the causes; however, looking to hazards tends to create a concentration
on risk.

The taxonomy focuses attention on the parts of the man-machine-environment

system which together produce hazards (13:50). The Army identified and published techniques for Risk Management most recently in Apr 1998, through FM 100-14.

The haz-

ards perspective provides the Army with methods of protecting of Army-wide investments
(35:2000).
Building a hazard taxonomy to recognize risk involves viewing the accident cases with
a new mindset, one that sees the mission, leadership, aircraft, and crew as contributors to
the case as a whole. Combinations of all these parts may provide the most comprehensive
determination of risk involved in the accidents as well as the degree to which soldiers are
exposed to the risk (35:2000).
In addition to the development of the hazard taxonomy, ASIST assessed the hazard
contribution for casualty, cost, and frequency.

Each assessment estimates the percent a

specific hazard contributes to the accident's cost, casualties, and occurrence.

A hazard

contributing to casualties specifically affects injuries and fatalities. A hazard's contribution
to cost indicates the percent of the total accident cost for which this hazard was responsible.
Finally, assessments of frequency refer to causes contributing to the occurrence of the
accident. An example case with contributing hazards follows in Table 3.1.
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Table 3.1

Contributing Hazards

Accident
Case

Contributing
Hazards

Casualties
Contribution

Cost
Contribution

Frequency
Contribution

19931019001

OH58-58
AVN-02
Total
AH64-62
AH64-69
AH64-70
AH64-71
AH64-85
Total

50
50
100
0
50
0
50
0
100

50
50
100
1
49
1
49
0
100

50
50
100
8
31
15
31
15
100

19960116001

3.2.1.2

Controls.

As part of their analysis, ASIST identified controls which

are actions taken to eliminate hazards or reduce their risk (8).

A typical value model

develops and evaluates alternatives based on what is important to the decision maker.
For this study, controls are the alternatives; they were generated by the ASIST team in
response to outstanding hazards. In ASIST, the controls were developed using the Army's
Doctrine, Training, Leader Development, Organization, Material, and Soldier Performance
(DTLOMS) framework.
ent effectiveness.

Controls may affect more than one hazard, each with a differ-

MIL-STD-882 system safety design order of preference determines the

individual control effectiveness estimates:
Table 3.2
1.
2.
3.
4.

Control Effectiveness Estimates

Design for minimum risk
Safety devices
Warning devices
Procedures and training

80-100%
60-80%
40-60%
20-40

The individual control effectiveness estimates for each hazard indicate the assessed
percent reduction. The area experts, Army aviators and other members of ASIST, dedicated many long hours to estimating hazard reduction achieved at the end of ten years of
control application.

ASIST has proposed, to date, 353 controls for the force-modernized

aircraft addressed in this study.

3-3

Control cost is categorized by the range of possible expenditures for 20-year implementation fleetwide.

The optimization uses the median value of the probable range to

estimate cost. Because controls will be selected for fleetwide use, individual aircraft cost
is not considered. Although only estimates, these costs provide a resource value by which
controls may be added to budget-specific portfolios.
Table 3.3

Estimated Control Cost Ranges

20 year fleetwide cost
$ 0 - 100K
$ 100K - IM
$ IM - 38M
$ 38M - 150M
> $ 150M

3.2.2

Possible Accident Input.

nil
very low
low
medium
high

Point Est. Cost
$ 50,000
$ 500,000
$ 19,000,000
$ 90,000,000
$ 200,000,000

In the simulation, the possible accidents for each

iteration are randomly drawn from past accident reports.

Replacement of the accident

data allows the possibility of the same accident occurring more than once within a single
iteration.

Due to the aggregation of all accident data for the force modernized aircraft,

AH-64, CH/MH-47, UH/MH-60, and OH-58D, the number of possible accidents for each
iteration is based on their overall accident rate during the past seven years. This method
of accident selection permits the future accidents per aircraft type to be based on the
accident data.

This removes the need to aggregate by aircraft type using normalized

hours flown or hours per actual aircraft per month.
By inspecting the accident cases, it is noted that accidents occur independently of
one another. The number of possible incidents in an interval of 100,000 flight hours can be
represented by a Poisson random variate (20:390). Each case represents a single incident
occurring at one point in time, which meets the first property of a Poisson process. Next,
the occurrence of accidents in one 100,000 flight-hour unit is not dependent on previous
incidents or on "run-up" time, as with the stand-up of a system.

The occurrence of

accidents in one set of 100,000 flight hours is independent from accidents occurring in a
completely separate or even an overlapping set of 100,000 flight hours.
random variate is well suited for generating inputs in this simulation.
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Thus, a Poisson

The most recent accident occurrence information best forecasts future accident occurrences.

Future possible accidents are derived from the Poisson distributed accident

rates for FY94 to FYOO, the period ASIST has analyzed to the present.

The actual

number of possible accidents in one iteration is produced by a random variate generator
based on the Poisson distributed accident data; for this analysis, a Poisson distribution
with parameter A = 11.89, the mean estimated from the accident data available.
3.2.3

Control Effectiveness.

Each selected control reduces the occurrence or

likelihood of certain hazards by an appropriate efficiency designated by the ASIST team.
The controls do not reduce all hazards with the same efficiency. For this reason, the lists
of controls must be examined to ensure that every hazard reduced by the selected portfolio
of controls is included. If multiple controls help reduce the same hazard, the difference in
reduction amounts must be addressed. When ASIST decided these effectiveness measures,
they called it a reduction in the likelihood of an accident. It is assumed in the study that
each reduction is to be taken from the remaining likelihood of an accident. Consider this
situation: three different controls all reduce the same hazard, but by different amounts.
If control H47-C05 reduces hazard H47-12 by 0.5; control H47-C16, by 0.5; and control
H47-C45, by 0.25, we cannot say that the total reduction for H47-12 is 1.25. Noting the
difficulty in completely evaluating the hazard list resulting from every control combination,
a generic method of combining reductions is suggested.

The additive, but not greater

than 1.0 model may simplify calculations, but such an approach incorrectly assumes that
hazards may be completely eliminated. A more conservative, and more realistic method of
integrating the hazards is a multiplicative combination, where e, represents the individual
effectiveness values:
i

Combined _Hazard_Reduction = 1 — TT(1 — e^).
l

Therefore take 25% of 50% of 50%; the result is a reduction of 0.8125. This is the hazard
reduction input into the model.
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3.2.4

Severity of Losses Model.

The Army Safety Center seeks to reduce accident

severity by 50% over the next ten years (beginning April 1999).

By reducing accident

severity, the important underlying issues, casualties and total cost, are also reduced. The
Severity of Losses model is a value-focused thinking model which addresses the important
facets of accident severity and accounts for the preferences of commanders to describe why
severity is important.

For the purpose of this analysis, it is assumed that reducing the

frequency or severity of contributing hazards should reduce the overall losses associated
with the accidents. The model describes the severity of accidents in 100,000 flight hours.
Severity, from a safety standpoint, must be minimized. To support a model that experts
and users alike understand, a value of 1.0 is given to the worst severity score, and a
severity score of 0.0 is the best, or least severe. Value-focused thinking models often scale
all alternatives on a 0 to 1 scale; however for severity, the goal is to obtain a score near
zero (19).
Army FM 100-14, entitled "Risk Management," states four criteria for assessing
severity: degree of injury or illness, repair or replacement costs, other mission impairing
factors, and environmental damage (8:2-9).

From these criteria, the top tier of the hier-

archy is derived: casualties corresponds to the degree of injury or illness, unit readiness
corresponds to other mission-impairing factors, total costs correspond to loss of or damage
to equipment or property, and environmental damage remains.

Severity of
Losses
1

1

I

Casualties

Unit Readiness

Figure 3.1

1
Total Costs

1

Environmental
Damage

Top Level of Severity of Losses Hierarchy

Each of these objectives are supported in FM 100-14 as the key objectives describing
severity.

The following sections address the reasons behind the development of these
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branches.

The severity functions for every evaluation measure are completely developed

in detail in Appendix A.
3.2.4.I

Casualties.

Casualties measures the contribution to severity made

by fatalities and injuries sustained due to accidents.

According to Army Risk Manage-

ment, FM 100-14, and USASC leadership, the following subobjectives effectively measure
casualties contribution to severity from the Army-level perspective (Warren, 2000). These
components are shown in Figure 3.2 and addressed individually in the following subsections.

Casualties
1
Loss of Life

Figure 3.2

Permanent
Disabilities

1
Time
Incapacitated

Sub-objectives for Casualties

Loss of Life assesses the impact of all fatalities on the Army; it measures the severity
of the number of fatalities for 100,000 flight hours. This natural-direct measure includes
all fatalities resulting from an accident, military and civilian personnel.
Permanent disabilities fall into two categories, partial and total. The Army Safety
center tracks both types of injuries in the Risk Management Information Database (RMIS).
Total disabilities, as determined by the opinion of competent medical authority, compromise any nonfatal injury that permanently and totally incapacitates a person to the extent
that he or she cannot find any gainful employment (DA PAM 385-40, 1994: Glossary).
Rarely do these types of injuries result from aviation accidents.

The Severity of Losses

model accounts for this type of loss; however, due to the lack of any occurrence of permanent total disabilities in this data sample, this measure is not used in this study.
Permanent partial disabilities is a natural-direct measure, and it assesses the contribution to severity of losses from permanent disabilities. Although also rare, its occurrence
is severe enough to include in the model. A permanent partial disability is any injury (not
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resulting in death or permanent total disability) that, in the opinion of competent medical
authority, results in the loss or permanent impairment of any part of the body, with the
following exceptions:

1. Loss of teeth.
2. Loss of fingernails or toenails.
3. Loss of tip of fingers or tip of toe without bone involvement.
4. Inguinal hernia, if it is repaired.
5. Disfigurement
6. Sprains that do not cause permanent limitation of motion
(DA PAM 385-40, Glossary).
Time incapacitated is a natural-direct measure of the severity of losses resulting from
days of hospitalization due to aviation accidents. "Admission to a hospital as an inpatient
for medical treatment" officially defines hospitialization (DA PAM 385-40, 1994: Glossary).
Days hospitalized counts only the hospitalization of military personnel.
3.2.4.2

Unit Readiness.

Any loss not only affects the Army as a whole,

it certainly directly impacts the individual units as well.

The unit readiness objective

measures the severity of losses in terms of the impact these losses have on individual
battalions.

As representative of FM 100-14's mission-impairing factors, unit readiness

identifies the following sub-objectives as major contributing factors: training execution,
unit morale, and equipment availability.
Training execution is a natural-proxy scale that assesses the impact of decreased
training on unit readiness.

Commanders are believed to become more risk averse as

accidents increase within the unit. The battalion commander may react to recent accidents
by reducing the complexity, realism, sophistication of training, or amount of training for
the unit. This change in mission plans and execution results in decreased unit readiness.
Training execution measures the number and class of the accidents that occur in a single
unit. Assessment and opinions here are drawn from an interview with LTC Semmens (13).

3-8

Unit
Readiness
1

1

Unit
Morale
1

Training
Execution

1
Magnitude of
Injury

Figure 3.3

Equipment
Availability
1
Loss of
Life

Sub-objectives for Unit Readiness

Soldiers within a unit drive the level of readiness. Any decrease in unit morale will
have a detrimental effect on unit readiness.

Although many issues may be identified to

assess the impact of aircraft accidents on unit morale, two major influences were identified:
loss of life and magnitude of injury. Loss of life is a natural-proxy measure for assessing
the decrease in unit morale due to the number of fatalities in the unit.

The emotional

impact on soldiers affects performance and consequently unit morale.

Acknowledging

that fatalities are not the only factor impacting unit morale, magnitude of injury uses
a constructed scale to measure how permanent disabilities and hospitalizations of fellow
soldiers result in decreased morale. This proxy scale is weighted to indicate that permanent
injuries have a large impact, as do lengthy hospitalizations.
Table 3.4

Injury Category Classification

No injuries requiring hospitalization
Injuries requiring < 7 days hospitalization
Injuries requiring > 7 days hospitalization, no permanent disabilities
Injuries resulting in permanent disabilities
Equipment availability assesses the impact on unit readiness of having fewer aircraft
for a unit. This natural-proxy measure assesses the number of unavailable aircraft within
the unit.

An aircraft is defined unavailable when it is deemed a total loss or requires

greater than 40 man-hours to repair.

If an aircraft requires more than 40 man-hours to

repair, it is assumed that repairs would not be accomplished at the unit level, but rather
at post or depot level (13).

An aircraft will be considered a total loss when it is not
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economically repairable. An estimate of man-hours required first appears in the accident
report; however, the final number of hours necessary are recorded and this study uses
this man-hour total.

Time to assess and estimate damage, as well as repair and replace

damaged and not economically repairable parts, are all counted for the final total (9:2-11).
3.2.4.3

Total Costs.

Total costs is a natural-direct measure assessing the

severity of accidents in terms of the dollar cost to the Army.
includes the following as Army accident costs:

Army Regulation 735-11

injury costs, repair/replacement costs,

and other military and non-military damage costs resulting from accidents.

Accident

investigation teams use accident cost to determine the classification.

Total Costs
— Repair/Replacement +
Injury Costs +
Damage Costs
Figure 3.4

Details of Total Cost Objective

Repair and replacement costs include all costs incurred from aircraft damage.

In

the event of a total loss, the acquisition cost is used as the cost to replace. If the aircraft
is repairable, man-hour costs and parts replacement costs will be used (9:2-11).
Injury costs include medical expenses; however, they do not estimate the monetary
loss incurred while the soldier is not mission capable. Specifically, indirect costs associated
with the accident such as production loss, or wages lost to employees not injured, and the
cost of hiring and training new employees are not included.

Injury costs consist of the

cost of pay while away from work, medical treatment, hospitalization, dependent survival,
unused training costs, gratuities, compensation, disability retirement, and burial.

An

actual time away from work is included, if known, when the accident report is submitted;
otherwise, an estimate of lost workdays made by a competent medical authority is used
(9:2-11).
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3.2-4-4

Environmental Damage.

The final objective contributing to the

severity of losses is environmental damage. Balancing damage to the environment against
national objectives, often means choosing the national objective, yet doing everything reasonable to minimize environmental damage.

The US Army Engineer School, the executive

agent for Military Environmental Protection, provides the applicable sub-objectives in the
Military Environmental Protection Manual (7). Damage is categorized by the element
damaged; the Army is concerned with spills that will damage the soil and water.

Air-

craft accidents may leak fuel, hydraulic fluid and oil. Currently, a detailed assessment of
environmental damage is not available due to the lack of data.

Environmental
Damage
I

1

Water Damage

Soil Damage
— Fuel Spills
— Hydraulic Fhjid
Spills
— Oil Spills
Figure 3.5

— Fuel Spills
— Hydraulic Fluid
Spills
— Oil Spills

Sub-objectives for Environmental Damage

The Army categorizes hazardous fluid spills by the number of gallons spilled. Because
of its importance, the measures for an assessment of severity based on spill type and
environment rely on this limited information. The constructed-direct measure of severity
of environmental damage accounts for effects on environment and clean-up required.
Table 3.5
Category
Category
Category
Category
Category
Category

0
1
2
3:
4:
5:

Hazardous Fluid Spills Classification

No hazardous fluid spilled
Less than 1 gallon of hazardous fluid spilled
More than 1 gallon, but less than 2 gallons
More than 2 gallons, but less than 10 gallons
More than 10 gallons, but less than 20 gallons
More than 20 gallons spilled
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3.2.5

Bootstrapping Using Monte-Carlo Simulation.

Bootstrapping statistics

using Monte-Carlo samples is employed in this simulation by using Palisade's ©RISK
software. This technique statistically samples and analyzes data from an unknown distribution. The number of possible accidents for one iteration is generated by a pre-defined
random Poisson variate. Once the number of accidents to evaluate has been selected, the
actual accidents to be simulated are drawn randomly, with replacement, from the complete
list of cases evaluated by ASIST. Independence of runs is assumed.
3.2.5.1

Number of Sample Runs.

The number of runs in part determines

the accuracy of an estimator. The estimator of interest for this study is percent severity
reduction, as generated by the Severity Reduction Simulation.

To evaluate portfolios of

controls with regard to one another, an estimate of the performance measure within an
accuracy e with specified confidence 100(l-a)% must be known. To determine the number
of runs necessary to obtain the relevant statistics, means and 90% confidence intervals, use
of the equation for the student t statistic allows for the determination of the number of
replications, R, needed. R replications are always greater than R0 sample runs (2:439).
R > (*a/2,R-i

x

S0/e)2

where a = 0.1, 52 = the variance for R0 sample runs,

and £a/2,R-iis determined from the student t tables.

For this study, the average severity

reduction for 27 blocks of 100,000 flight hours, an estimated five year period, composes
a single sample run.

The variance observed for a particular run is S0 — 0.00033.

The

specified accuracy is e = 0.01, or 1%.
Using the cumulative normal distribution,
R > (za/2 x S0/ef = (1.6452 x 0.00033/0.012) = 8.93.
Since R must be > 9, proceeding with the student-* equations, the smallest integer R
that satisfies the inequality is 11: 11 > (1.812 x 0.00033/0.012) = 10.81.
Thus, to estimate the mean, 11 replications must be performed.

In accordance

with Efron and Tibshirani, ten times the number of replications should be performed
to accurately estimate the confidence intervals using the bootstrap method.
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Therefore,

110 replications are run when estimating confidence intervals.

The expected Severity

Reduction for any one block of 100,000 flight hours in the estimated five years of Army
flight hours is passed to the optimization program.
3.2.6

Process Overview.

One iteration consists of a portfolio of controls input, a

possible accident draw, and a severity reduction output. First, because each control has a
reduction efficiency for certain hazards, the input control list is reviewed and translated into
terms of hazards and their effectiveness. Next, the assigned number of accidents from the
draw are selected from the database and, where applicable, the accident data is reduced as
it could have happened when the control was applied. The resulting cumulative accident
data for one iteration is next evaluated in the Severity of Losses value model to obtain
the Severity value for both what the accidents would have been without the portfolio
of controls and what the accidents result is with the portfolio applied.

As previously

mentioned, this procedure is repeated to obtain reliable statistics for its expected value.
A detailed explanation is included in Appendix B.

/ Possible
/ Accidents
'Distribution ,

®
Single_Run

Returns 5 year Expected
percent Severity
Reduction

(D
I Portfolio ,
of Controls/

Key:
Functions and Subs
'Data and Inputs/

* Get_Haz_and_Eff

Do_a_rep
Iterate to simulate
5 years of 100,000
Flight hours blocks

Fill_Matrices_and_Array

Returns percent
Severity Reduction
for 100,000 fit hours
Function

Rand_Draw

Figure 3.6

The Severity Reduction Simulation Complete Process Diagram
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3.3

Optimizing the Portfolios
The Army's objective is to obtain a 50% reduction in accident severity, to gain the

greatest reduction in accident rate, accident cost, and casualties. The first section of this
chapter established the model which returns an accepted estimate of severity reduction,
an overall measure of the Army's objective.

This section establishes the best technique

for selecting sets of controls based on a given budget.

This study analyzes a set of 353

controls. Each control may be selected, or may not be selected for the portfolio; this results
in 2353, or 1.8 x 10106 different possible portfolios, clearly computationally intractable to
completely enumerate.
3.3.1

Unique Problem Characteristics.

This portfolio selection problem is unique

because of several features: first, the objective function is not differentiable; second, the
interaction between controls is unpredictable; and third, the size of the problem makes
enumeration impossible. There are procedures in existence to accommodate some of these
characteristics, and an eclectic approach that ensures key assumptions are met is the best
solution.
It is possible to evaluate controls individually and then take a traditional portfolio
optimization approach as suggested by Kirkwood or Keeney; however, both assume additivity of the values (19:207). The nature of the ASIST data set, as described in Section
3.2.3, and the case information suggest that an additive severity reduction is not appropriate.

Consequently, the fundamental assumption based on the data sets is that when

multiple controls are applied, a synergistic effect may be observed.

By observing the

expected severity reduction of a specified portfolio, iterative adjustments provide insight
into the possible interactions present returning the greatest improvement.
3.3.2

The Search Procedure.

Following Pirkul's multiple knapsack heuristic,

pertinent observations may be made and useful solutions can be obtained.

The Severity

Reduction Simulation takes a portfolio and accident distribution input and returns the
expected severity reduction (%) for that portfolio. In order to estimate the impact each
control makes when it is evaluated alone, a portfolio is created with only one control in it.
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Obtaining a reasonable starting point begins by evaluating all 353 single control portfolios.
Acknowledging that the sum of these reductions by themselves exceed 1.0, the interactions
must be both positive and negative.

In addition, there are specific constraints inherent

to the controls that must be considered. For example H47-C09 and H47-C10 would never
logically be applied simultaneously.

To avoid this procedure recommending infeasible

portfolios, multiple choice constraints, as appropriate, are built into the base portfolio
optimization procedure.
The program developed in the study uses traditional binary integer programming
techniques to maximize a surrogate objective function where the coefficients for each decision variable are the reduction values from the each single control portfolio.

The con-

straints consist of the resource constraint, the budget, and the mutually exclusive control
application constraints that restrict specific combinations. Finally as defined by the program type, all decision variables in this program are binary.

The solution obtained by

this surrogate objective function purely estimates the magnitude of reduction. The actual
percent severity reduction returned by the specified portfolio is less than the surrogate.
Base points for several levels of representative budgets are analyzed; the results
provide insights into what the expected level of reduction for a given budget could be. In
each additional portfolio analysis, the knapsack's resource constraint, in this case budget,
appears. A linear comparison of what the integer program expects versus what the Severity
Reduction Simulation actually returns initially reveals the direction that the expansion
should take.
Incorporating direct search derivative-free methodology, effective and efficient use of
the severity reduction simulation can be observed.

The knapsack heuristic generates a

set of local portfolios out of modified base portfolios, and seeking to identify improvement
in those base portfolios. This iterative replacement of variables with those having a high
benefit-cost ratio enables new interactions to appear while feasibility is maintained. This
effective method of identifying local improvement may help identify portfolios that contain
synergistic interactions.
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Test Portfolios
Control
AH64-C28
AH64-C38
AH64-C56
AH64-C86
H47-C06
H47-C100
H47-C65
H47-C96
H60-C09
H60-C34
H60-C41
H60-C44
OH58-C03
OH58-C11
OH58-C31
OH58-C72

Severity
Cost Benefit/Cost
Base
Reduction ($M)
Ratio
Portfolio
1
0.000015
0.000001 0.05
1
0.029726
0.014863 0.50
1
0.001369
0.026011 19.00
0
0.000000
0.000036 90.00
1
0.000377
0.007159 19.00
1
0.000049
0.009747 200.00
0.001813
1
0.000091 0.05
1
0.014490
0.000725 0.05
1
0.001828
0.034728 19.00
0
0.000177
200.00
0.035315
0
0.613133
0.030657 0.05
0.000332
0
0.029879 90.00
1
0.000138
0.012381 90.00
0.061440
0
0.003072 0.05
1
0.000499
0.009477 19.00
0.001154
0
0.000058 0.05

Figure 3.7
3.3.2.1

12345678910
0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 0 1 1 ] 1 1 1 1
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 *1
1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 *2!
0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1
0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0
0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 *3\

Example of Knapsack Heuristic Generation of Test Portfolios
A Knapsack Heuristic Example.

This example uses actual controls,

their individual severity reductions, and estimated cost.

As displayed in Figure 3.7, the

number of selected items in the initial base portfolio indicates the number of test portfolios
generated for the local region. A new test portfolio is generated by setting each 1 equal to
0 and placing the remaining budget slack into other unselected controls to fill the budget
keeping the portfolio feasible. There are four possible trends for the unselected controls to
assume in the test portfolios generated by the method. First (indicated by *1 in the table
from Figure 3.7) a control may be selected infrequently, such as the case when an expensive
control is unselected. A second possible trend is seen in note *2 (in the table from Figure
3.7); this control is never selected often due to high cost and low reduction.

The third,

and most common trend, occurs when a control is selected because of a high benefit-cost
ratio, but this is dependent on available slack budget (see note *3 in the table from Figure
3.7).

The final, and not displayed, trend is the always selected control.

Unselected

variables in the lowest cost category with high benefit-cost can be selected with priority
for each additional test portfolio.

Each selected variable, as indicated by a 1 in the test

portfolio column, initiates the formation of test portfolios. The values returned for each
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test portfolio may show improvement; estimates about the mean, standard deviation and
confidence intervals indicate any statistical difference in the portfolios.

3.4

Methodology Summary
This methodology enables the Safety Center to incorporate ASIST analysis and Risk

Management Information System (RMIS) data into a samples that demonstrate accident
sets based on an accepted standard of severity

The Severity of Losses model defines

the factors of severity that are most important for a balanced evaluation of severity. The
Severity Reduction simulation evaluates each portfolio of controls and is able to provide the
90% confidence interval for the expected mean Severity Reduction.

Using Direct Search

techniques to make the best use of the simulation results, the objective values returned
by the simulation are evaluated using a multiple choice knapsack heuristic. The following
chapter explores the results of this methodology applied to the control-portfolio selection
problem.
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IV. Severity Reduction Analysis
4-1

Top-Level Portfolio Selection Overview
This research develops a tool that enables the Army Safety Center to select a port-

folio of controls that reduces severity of aviation accidents by 50%; as an example, use
the force modernized aircraft, AH-64, CH/MH-47, OH-58D, and UH/MH-60. This goal,
set by the Under Secretary for Acquisition and Technology, Army, involves incorporating the risk management process with available accident investigation information and
ASIST-identified hazards and controls.

ASIST first performed a hazard analysis that

both identified hazards and the accident cases involving them.

Next, ASIST looked at

each accident case and the hazards contributing to it and assigned what percent of the
total cost, casualties, and frequency of the accident each hazard was responsible for. These
percent contribution values quantify the preventative components of each accident. The
controls generated by ASIST are tailored to fit individual hazards and eliminate their influence on the fleet. ASIST hypothesized effectiveness values for every control-hazard pair;
these unique pair combinations allow controls to impact multiple hazards with different
values.

Meeting the Army goal requires examining selected sets of controls, portfolios of

controls, and finding the combination that returns the greatest reduction in accidents for
a given budget amount.
Selecting an individual control or obtaining a ranked list of top controls requires
an understanding of what makes a control effective.

Speaking outside of the Severity

Reduction Simulation for a moment, if a specific type of accident occurred frequently, for
example a tree strike, the following actual hazard statement would capture the occurrence
of such an event:

Table 4.1
Hazard H60-06

Example Hazard Statement

Loss of situational awareness (as a result of
distance estimation, varying workload, environmental, and visual issues) while maneuvering in
close proximity to trees or objects may result in
the aircraft striking the trees or objects.
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Several controls proposed by ASIST aid the elimination of this hazard. The Safety
Center generally assumes that a hazard will not be entirely eliminated; however, it is
possible to nearly eliminate some types of hazards by implementing tractable controls.
Specific controls that impact hazard H60-06 are listed in Table 4.2.

Table 4.2
Control
H60-C03

H60-C06
H60-C07
H60-C08
H60-C10

H60-C11
H60-C16
H60-C24

Controls that Impact Hazard H60-06

Control Statement
Change ATM to establish new flying hour category for individual task flight training hours
and resource individual training.
Establish and sustain crewchief's "school
house" training program
Establish crew coordination sustainment program
Establish standards for and resource a 4th
crew member for high workload ops
Implement a change to the flight control system to improve aircraft stability and control
in low speed flight (Attitude Command Attitude Hold)
Increase the available aircrew experience
Develop and field a proximity warning system
(Virtual Rotor Disk)
Develop and install new Night Vision Systems

Effectiveness
0.25

0.35
0.5
0.45
0.5

0.25
0.7
0.5

This table indicates the numerous possible 'solutions' to the hazard problem stated
above.

Each hazard within the system has at least one control that may be selected

to reduce its likelihood or severity.

Generally, the more controls selected to reduce a

single hazard, the less frequently it will occur. The conscious selection of controls involves
analyzing accident cases to identify the most frequent and most severe hazards, observing
the controls that act to reduce these particular hazards, and simulating the interactions of
simultaneously applied controls.
This chapter addresses the percent severity reduction output obtained by simulated
portfolios and identifies valuable insights from the reductions gained by these. The search
procedure first explores the output obtained from an integer programming solution, then it
4-2

investigates the local region. The goal was to obtain a single optimal portfolio of controls;
however, this analysis displays the actual plethora of reasonable control portfolios with an
explanation of the response and the justification for future recommendations.
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The Integer Problem
This problem takes input from the Severity Reduction Simulation and focuses on

returning a good starting solution. The analysis begins with the single control portfolios,
then the formulation of the problem, and finally insights gained by this process.
4.2.1

Individual Control Effectiveness.

Implementing single control portfolios

allowed each control to be evaluated to determine its mean percent severity reduction for
blocks of 100,000 flight hours over five years in the force modernized aircraft addressed.
Controls are designed to reduce accidents for a particular airframe; hazards may affect
multiple airframes.

The percent composition, by airframe, of the ASIST-evaluated acci-

dent cases, FY94 through FY98, reveals the possible accident draw likelihood as depicted
in Figure 4.1. Estimation of the severity contribution of each airframe requires a common
factor, such as percent of total hours flown by a specific airframe, to combine severity
scores.

It may be estimated, that the percent of actual incidents in each airframe is a

better standard by which to aggregate severity than the percent total hours flown in a year.
From the information contained in this chart, the cumulative distribution representing the
percentiles explains the selection of possible accidents.
An individual control's severity reduction must be less than the affected aircraft's
percent composition of the data set because if it was possible to decrease all accidents for
that type, the overall severity reduction is expected to be same as percent composition. A
specific hazard may cause several incidents within a selected set of data, the simple relative
volume of accidents caused by a particular hazard can indicate its severity. By selecting
a control that reduces these most commonly occurring hazards, the overall severity is
decreased. When an individual control is applied, it reduces the accident severity for that
type of airframe. The best reduction found by this study for any single control portfolio
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Figure 4.1

Cumulative Composition of the Data Set by Airframe

is less than 4% over all the force modernized aircraft. The single control reductions serve
to estimate the possible multiple control portfolios.
4.2.2

Problem Formulation.

This problem solves the surrogate objective function

for an estimated Severity Reduction value.

These surrogate function coefficients were

derived by finding the mean reduction when a portfolio consisted of a single control. The
budget serves as the primary knapsack resource constraint. The additional constraints in
this integer program serve to eliminate the application of overlapping controls.

Insights

into the process has led the Safety Center to remove a few decision variables from the set,
these variables will always equal zero.

There are 353 variables and 15 constraints.

The

Xi variables are the binary control selection variables, the Ri variables are the reduction
values, and the Q variables are the cost of individual controls. The objective is to estimate
the largest percent reduction obtainable from the combination of controls. The model is:
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Maximized = £ Rt ■ X<

(SLP)

subject to
Ci ■ Xi

< Budget

AH64C22 + AH64C26

< 1

AH64C52 + AH64C53

< 1

tf47C*87 + #47C124

<1

#47C105 + #47C127

< 1

H47C52 + H47CY17

< 1

H47C103 + H47C127

< 1

H47C09 + H47C10

< 1

i760C34 - H60C44

<0

H60C25 + HQ0C46

< 1

H60C16 + H60C20

< 1

H60C20 + HQ0C21

< 1

Ü60C15 + H60C24

< 1

H60C17 + HWC44

< 1

371^64065 - AH64C66 - AH64C67 - AH64C69

<0

^ = {0,1}
Solving this surrogate linear program returns an appropriate, reasonable starting
portfolio given a budget. Discussion with the Army Safety Center led to the establishment
of a $1 billion budget.

Sensitivity analysis about this fixed budget has been performed

for a wide range of cost ($M) because the controls selected to be funded by the Army
are not based on filling a given budget, but meeting the set reduction goals.

Therefore,

acceptance of a budgeted portfolio of controls depends on the quality of the contents of
the items in the Program Objective Memorandum (POM). The Safety Center budget
allocations for the application of controls are based not on overall cost, but rather on likely
outcome received.
The linear program assumes an additive objective function. Using Frontline System's
Premium Solver Platform, to find the solution to the linear program given by SLP, the
optimal base portfolio is found. It can be seen through testing (see Figure 4.2) that the sum
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of single control portfolios is not necessarily equal to the severity reduction value obtained
from the portfolio containing the same controls.

Therefore, the value of the surrogate

objective function is an ordinal representation of the magnitude of severity reduction, not
an actual expected percent severity reduction.
Comparison of Percent Severity Reduction

a 0.8
o
0.6

♦ Budget
Based
▲ Resource
Allocation
□ Base
Portfolio
-*— Equality
^

0.4

^♦^♦♦«♦**0*

0.6

0.8

1.0

Additive Surrogate

Figure 4.2

Demonstration of Inadequacies of Surrogate Objective Value Compared to
the Simulated Value

From Figure 4.2 the base portfolio (D) consists of 159 controls selected to maximize
percent severity reduction.
percent.

This portfolio returns an expected severity reduction of 35

For comparison, several potential starting portfolios (A) were derived using

various resource allocation techniques, including a cost-effectiveness ratio, best individual
severity reduction, and largest number of controls method. Another comparison standard
used the integer program with surrogate objective function to generate different portfolios
(♦) by varying the budget constraint. The following chart identifies the predicted surrogate
reduction in severity (x-axis) versus the actual observed mean reduction in severity (yaxis).

These clearly sub-optimal methods of completing the base portfolio indicate that,

although the surrogate function is known to be nebulous in its definition, it is an ordinal
representative of the actual percent severity reduction values.
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Optimal Region Search
The base portfolio resulted from fixing the budget to one billion dollars in the resource

constraint.

Given this initial solution, this study examines the improvement gained by

interchanging particular controls and searching in the local regions.

The method for

searching the region near the base portfolio removes each selected control individually and
utilizes the allocated budget to purchase the unselected control(s) that have the highest
cost-effectiveness.
The knapsack heuristic modified as described in Chapter Three utilizes this base
portfolio to generate 159 new test portfolios to examine for improvement.

The results

of this test indicate extremely small variation in the value range; no statistically different
portfolios resulted from this first examination. Figure 4.3 indicates the surrogate objective
value plotted versus the actual percent severity reduction observed by the simulation. This
portfolio solution displays a high degree of degeneracy arising from minute differences in
individual control reductions.

The maximum surrogate value frontier appears at 0.75

because the surrogate optimal function was found and multiple test portfolios with minimal
surrogate value differences exist near this value.
Sensitivity analysis to budget levels was then examined.

In an investigation of

portfolios at $750 million and $1.5 billion, very similar output occurred about the local
regions, see Figure 4.4.

Although the surrogate objective function increased, the actual

severity value observed by the simulation indicated little increase for the $750 million
budget increase. These regions also displayed a highly degenerate base portfolio.
The level of degeneracy led to a closer inspection of control cost and how its increase
affects the portfolio selection. For example, if all of the controls costing over $19 million
are eliminated from consideration, the resulting portfolio generated from this constrained
problem reveals selection preference.

The order of magnitude differences between cost

make selection of high budget controls, those over $20 million, very rare.
Examination of high-performing controls also provide insight into the types of controls returning maximum effectiveness. The cost-reduction comparison table that follows
identifies any effectiveness trends related to cost.
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These mean and observed reductions
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are shown with two significant digits to demonstrate the lack of precision offered by the
simulation.

Observe the similarity when all observations of each type are averaged; the

only dissimilarity occurs for the $0.05 million category, the category that contains the
largest number of observations and the largest number of 0.0% reductions. When seeking
to maximize reduction, the lowest reductions are not likely selected; therefore, observe
the best single percent reduction observations.

It is reasonable to expect significant dif-

ferences in the greatest reduction achieved by a single control in each cost category, but
there is less than 1% difference between four of the five categories.

Only $0.5 million

controls show increased severity. Nonetheless, selecting at most one control for each type
of aircraft would rarely be seen in a portfolio, so the five best controls from each category
have been evaluated to indicate their relative severity reduction.

The last two columns

of the cost-reduction comparison table indicate the percent range of severity reduction to
expect for the top five controls. The $200 million category and the $0.05 million category
particularly draw attention by indicating that, on one hand, for $1 billion a 10% reduction
in severity is possible while, on the other hand, a 10% severity reduction is also possible
costing only $0.2 million, when the functions behave as modeled.
Table 4.3
Control Cost
$200,000,000
$ 90,000,000
$ 19,000,000
$
500,000
$
50,000

4.3.1

Number
of Controls
49
66
87
31
120

Cost-Benefit Insights.

Effectiveness Trends.
All Avg
0.0044
0.0046
0.0032
0.0040
0.0019

Severity Reduction
Best
Top 5 Total Top 5 Avg
0.020
0.035
0.10
0.030
0.039
0.15
0.027
0.036
0.13
0.012
0.014
0.057
0.020
0.031
0.099

The analysis examining the similar reduction in

severity for controls in significantly different cost ranges reveals the most significant insight
to this study. Exhausting a specified budget should not be the objective. The Army Safety
Center desires the capability to recommend a "One to Goal list" composed of the number
of specific controls it takes to obtain a 50% reduction in severity.

To rank the Safety

Center's "One to Goal" list, while still accounting for the interactions only revealed by the
simulation, expensive controls must be selected as a result of known performance versus
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Plot of Individual Control Severity Reductions by Control Cost

Rarely would a single $200 million control reduce severity greater than 400 $0.5

million controls, even including decreasing marginal returns.

The orders of magnitude

difference in cost estimation often complicate selecting the best set of controls.
The actual portfolios observed by this research indicate no statistical difference because of this problem; as an inexpensive control is removed, another replaces it. The final
cost of these controls are exactly the same, and even though the severity reduction may
be similar, the overall mean cannot change significantly.
4.3.2

Constrained Searching.

The previous results indicate a need to examine

controls when a tighter budget is specified.

The orders of magnitude difference between

some control's cost eliminates any ability to capture the sensitivity of the higher cost controls. The small variations in effectiveness between low-cost controls hides any significant
improvements from observation. Addition of a constraint limiting the selection controls to
those with a certain budget enables the surrogate integer program to search more specifically to identify the best control combinations. The two regions of consideration evaluated
separately in the problem include evaluating only controls that cost less than $1 million
and evaluating controls that cost more than $1 million. This partition was selected after
observing individual control impact on severity reduction; the marginal cost-effective reduction in severity points out extreme disparity between the best single control at $0.05
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million, 0.014 M/%, and the top single $200 million control, 64.5 M/%.

The overall

cost of all 353 controls examined totals $17,414,500; controls less than $1 million make up
43% of the number of controls (151) but less than 1% of the possible total cost ($21.5M).
Generating a new portfolio based on these diverse selection variables involves dividing the
decision variables into two sets, the high-cost controls (over $1 million) and the low-cost
ones (under $1 million). The individual cost sensitivities are extremely different between
the problems, therefore, solve the low-cost problem first. Aggregation of the new insights
to the current problem provides a new solution with less repetitive control switching.
The large set of possible controls allows a portfolio generation method to distribute
funds efficiently to within $19M of the budget limit, but at this point the remainder of
the budget is allocated to inexpensive, and sometimes inefficient, controls. The purpose of
this subproblem is to simplify the selection variable set, eliminating less effective controls
thereby forcing the remaining budget to be allocated to the more effective controls. The
low-cost control integer program introduces a constraint where ^ Ci ■ Xi = 0 for all i
with d > $1 million.

In addition, the resource constraint for the budget will have an

adjusted right hand side with an appropriate range for the low-cost controls, $2 million
to $10 million.

This maximum range is derived by summing the cost of the strongest

controls, those with an individual severity reduction greater than 0.001. The method for
selecting effective controls enabled the possible control set to be reduced by 77 inexpensive
controls.
Analysis of high-cost controls reveals that of the total 202 controls that cost greater
than $1 million, the cost and effort to analyze each alternative and reduce the possible
set outweigh the benefit of the results.

The integer program effectively selects essential

controls to accommodate the size of the control set. Consequently, no additional constraints
for high-cost controls have been added to the problem.
4.3.3

Expanding the search to a second base portfolio.

Using the constraints

generated by the cost-partitioned problem, the integer program recommends a secondary
base portfolio. This new potential control set forces the local knapsack search algorithm
to select higher cost controls to exchange when finding test portfolios. Eliminating extra-
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neous, less effective, controls requires different controls to be interchanged and the local
search region expanded. The secondary base portfolio contains 103 controls, which is 56
fewer than the first base portfolio, and observes a mean severity reduction within 1% (less)
of the first base portfolio. The cost of the secondary base portfolio is not more than $10
million less than the original base portfolio with budget constraint at $1 billion.
Enabling the local search to incorporate a wider range of controls reveals additional
search regions but, most importantly, additional insight into the performance of highcost controls.

The expected percent severity reduction for this region spans 3.5%.

No

portfolios in this set perform better than the best portfolios at the original base region.
The results of this test and sensitivity about this region do not indicate additional tests
and exploration are needed.

4-4

Selecting the Optimal Portfolio
The preceding search procedures guide the identification of the recommended port-

folio region and bracket a wide range of "good" portfolios. The actual selection of a single
portfolio provides some insight into the process. As noted in the previous sections, many
portfolios generated similarly to those in this set could represent good, possible options
for the decision makers at the Safety Center to examine; however, the real insight from
these portfolios focuses on the general response of the system.

Single control portfolios

evaluated by this simulation tend to return extremely small percent reductions.

One of

the best observed generated only a 3.5% reduction, that being control H60-C34 (addition
of Digital Source Collector (DSC), envelope cueing (exceedences), and notice to pilot of
exceedences/crew monitor). Single control portfolios much more frequently return severity
reductions around 0.03% such as AH64-C30, acquire crashworthy ERFS (Extended Range
Fuel System).
Examining portfolios across the range of budget values displays an increasing Severity
Reduction with increasing budget, see Figure 4.6. Unfortunately, as the budget increases,
the amount of reduction per dollar spent decreases. Single controls, when applied together
as portfolios, display diminishing marginal returns.

This finding is important, but not

unexpected based on the discussion in Section 3.2.3, because none of these simulated
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observations meet the goal of 50% reduction in severity. Previously, ASIST has been able
to meet the 50% goal by evaluating controls individually and assuming that every control
acted independently of others; the simulation results from this study disagree with that
assumption. These results indicate that as additional controls are added, severity decreases
at a decreasing rate.

The purely additive model does not represent this phenomenon.

These diminishing marginal returns suggest that spending an additional $1 billion may
not even return a significant decrease in severity.

More investigation into this aspect of

the problem is needed.
Simulated Percent Severity Reduction with
increasing Portfolio Budget
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Figure 4.6

Comparison of Additive Severity Reduction and Actual Simulated Severity
Reduction

There are two elements to selecting an acceptable portfolio: first, good controls must
be selected and second, interactions must be used to achieve maximum reduction.

An

acceptable portfolio meets all feasibility requirements defined in the constraints of the
integer program.
4.4.I

Finding better controls.

The results of this analysis of portfolios reveal that

individual controls that reduce the most severity effectively reduce the most frequently
occurring or the most severe hazards. In a way, the controls that show highest reduction are
the controls that best fit the definition of a control: an implemented action that reduces the
likelihood or severity of a hazard occurring. The first result should intuitively make sense,
to obtain the greatest reduction, fix the problems that occur most often. Control H60-C34
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is mentioned above, and this particular high-cost, material-driven solution returned good
reduction in severity primarily because it directly reduced AVN-01 hazards which appear
27 times in the accident data set.

A possible control may also decrease severity by a

substantial amount if, although an specific hazard occurs infrequently, the results of it ever
occurring are catastrophic. Note hazard AH64-10, failure of the yellow engine harness can
cause the HMU to command the engine power to either underspeed or overspeed resulting in
degraded engine performance and possible aircraft damage. This hazard only appears twice
in the current accident data set; however, implementation of control AH64-C38, mandatory
replacement with new yellow harness, entirely eliminates this hazard. Consequently this
single control, has a severity reduction of 1.5%, one of the best 25 individual controls.
If selecting an individual control, note the specific cost, casualty, and frequency
contributions of the affected hazard. A single control may only eliminate the severity of
cost and leave casualties at the current level. The contribution break down enables a user
to figure out what severity issues are reduced by a specific hazard. The affect of different
hazards contributing to the same incident leads to the incorporation of multiple controls
as a better method for reducing severity.
4.4.2

Finding better portfolios.

When evaluating the surrogate objective func-

tion to initialize the search region, the result of this additive model indicated that although
the coefficients accurately represent single controls, their combined output differed significantly. Each expected severity reduction observed as output of the model under-achieves
the projected percent reduction.

The combined hazard effectiveness value rationally re-

duces the effect of two controls acting on one hazard; this is one cause of over estimation.
Due to innumerable control combinations, simulation output must be used in conjunction
with search methods to find and accurately identify effective control combinations.
The differences between the mean severity reductions that span $100 million through
$1.5 billion is approximately 0.05.

The 90% confidence interval about the $95 million

budget is (0.23, 0.38); the 90% confidence interval about the $1.5 billion portfolio is (0.28,
0.41).
budget.

These differences arouse interest about the controls contained in the low-cost
An analysis of the difference between the 134 controls in the low-cost portfolio
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and the 159 controls in the $1 billion portfolio.

Note the small difference in the number

of controls, closer inspection reveals that the remaining $900 million funds more expensive
controls. When these individual budgets are broken down by DOTLMS area, percentage
weight of the budget shifts from training controls in the low-cost portfolio to materiel in
the high-cost budget.
DTLOMS Areas for $100M budget
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Budget Proportions for DTLOMS with a $100M budget portfolio
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Budget Proportions for DTLOMS with a $1B budget portfolio

The cost scale differences are of particular significance, showing the relative differences. From these charts, note the weighty proportion of the cost spent on AH-64 materiel.
The UH-60 places demands on the budget for its materiel controls when funds are avail-
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able, but under a lower budget uses training to reduce accidents. These bar charts provide
insight that a decision maker could use when adapting to changing budget allocations.
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Results Summary
This chapter explored individual controls and the responses of portfolios; both pro-

vided insights for decision makers to consider.

None of the observed portfolios attained

the goal of a 50% reduction in severity; however, the method of aggregating all data into
one general set and the conservative method of estimating hazard reduction impacted these
results.

Based upon the responses attained, the Severity Reduction Simulation suggests

a more detailed analysis of the interactions of promising portfolios of controls.

It also

suggests focusing portfolio selection on a careful examination of low-cost controls within
an assumed budget.
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V.

Conclusions

The Army Safety Center initiated this partnership with AFIT to better analyze and answer one question: how can we meet the Secretary's goal of a 3a reduction in accidents?
Since this time, the goal has become more specific, by defining severity, and now asks:
what are the best controls to apply to obtain a 50% reduction in severity? This research
effort integrates several operations research techniques, incorporating the data collected
in the Risk Management Information System and the insights of experts and the USASC
leadership, to form a process that helps the Army meet their goal.

Using decision anal-

ysis, Monte-Carlo simulation, linear programming, and search heuristics, the combined
methodology demonstrated within this study recommends techniques for the selection of
control portfolios. The methodology provided by this research assists the Army Safety
Center in accomplishing their mission; it takes a proactive approach to hazard analysis
while incorporating risk management tools with the ultimate goal of "preventing the accidental loss of America's most precious resources- it's sons and daughters- and conserving
[their] materiel resources" (1).

5.1

Overview of Results
Incorporating multiple analysis techniques into an automated system provides a mea-

sure of mean severity reduction for a particular portfolio of controls.

These controls, as

identified and evaluated by ASIST, decrease the likelihood or severity of an accident.
Insights presented in Section 4.2.1 provide ways to interpret the control's effectiveness.
Although there are many ways to select particular portfolios from the 2353 = 1.8 x 10106
possible options, the integer program with surrogate coefficients results in a consistent
measure that ordinally represents actual portfolio reductions. Exploring the regions surrounding the base point involves generating many portfolios in the local region.

The

problem evolved further after a lack of sensitivity to cost was observed; the addition of a
constraint limiting the low-cost controls minimized the search region and recommended a
slightly different alternative base portfolio.

No single optimal portfolio from the multi-

tude of possible controls is recommended, however, regions for reasonable operations can
be identified using this methodology.

The following sections identify specific criteria for
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selecting portfolios and also explain further steps that may enable this methodology to
return more specific values.

5.2

Benefit Added by the Research
This research represents the third step of an on-going partnership between USASC

and AFIT; portions of this work are an adaptation and enhancement of previous work. The
points presented here identify the unique benefits of this work. Previous work addressed
the aviation accident severity from a narrower viewpoint; this study takes the first step
toward joining multiple systems into a single set for measuring accident severity.

The

examination of portfolios of controls, used in the search algorithm, clearly points out that
the system displays diminishing marginal returns in Severity Reduction with respect to
cost.

In the course of the effort, errors within H-47 ASIST database were detected, and

once these errors are rectified, future efforts will be able to use ASIST CH/MH-47 data
as actual, rather than just notional, data.

Increasing the usability of the system was a

primary focus early in the effort. At the conclusion of this effort, there exists an automated
severity reduction simulation ready to be integrated into @RISK, or another Excel-based
simulation software.
Many possible integration standards were considered for combining multiple systems
into a more Army-focused model. To aggregate accident severity by system, the primary
question is: "what is the best predictor of future accidents, by type?"

Hours flown by

aircraft type, hours flown per month per aircraft, straight percent composition of the
fleet, and actual past accidents are all measures for aggregating accident data. The Safety
Center desires the focus to remain at the highest level possible, the Army-focused approach,
because the target is an Army-level goal of 50% reduction in severity.

To best answer

this question, the ASIST-evaluated accident cases were combined into a single set.

A

Poisson- based random variate generated possible accident numbers, and actual cases were
randomly selected as possible accidents. Therefore, the distribution of systems selected are
based on the percentage of each aircraft type as represented in the database. Aggregating
by this factor implies that future accidents will tend to be distributed, over aircraft types,
in the future as the distributions have been in the past {i.e., time-invariant).
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The original ASIST implementation of the data found each aviation control value,
and ranked the controls, and then considered cost to select the "One to Goal List." This
method makes several assumptions, including the additivity of severity reduction. This
research demonstrates that when combining controls into a set, if their total reduction is
less than the sum of the individual control reductions, a shortfall occurs.

Because the

Army desires to achieve 50% reduction in severity, particular attention must be afforded
to the assumption of additivity of severity.

As noted in Section 4.3.1, a comparison of

cost versus effectiveness consistently displays diminishing marginal returns.

Currently,

simulation techniques most effectively incorporate the uncertainty of accident occurrences
with the possible types to provide expected ranges for the mean severity reduction. These
techniques should be updated as necessary to keep the input current and provide the best
model of commander preference and observation.
Using notional data for the ASIST-evaluated information on the H-47 airframe, this
study to modeled the complete force-modernized aircraft branch of the Army severity
model.

Corrected data for the H-47 database is forthcoming; integrating this corrected

information involves nothing more than basic spreadsheet manipulation.
Prior to this effort, a good simulation methodology was in place; however, this highlyinteractive system required significant man-hours and provided plenty of opportunity for
human error.

To evaluate portfolios, this research developed a system that takes a dis-

tribution, a 0-1 portfolio specifying a set of controls, and its location and returns a mean
severity reduction.

This system is described in more detail in Appendix B.

This Sin-

gle_Run routine was developed to return output that is then used in an ©RISK model.
Although each simulation takes approximately three minutes to complete, the operator
now benefits from significantly shortened set-up processing.
The Safety Center benefits from sponsoring this effort by obtaining a clarified methodology, an improved database, and a more user-friendly system. The Safety Center intends
to continue this partnership and further expand this model. There is also the possibility
that the Value-Focused Thinking approach may be used across services.
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5.3

Insights
Obtaining a high reduction in severity, specifically a reduction greater than 40%,

is extremely rare using this model with the current data set.

Because the Army seeks

to reduce severity by at least 50%, this is a significant problem.

A hypothesized reason

for the sub-standard reduction in severity comes from the actual Severity of Losses values
returned by each individual repetition within an iteration.

The individual repetition

calculates a Severity of Losses for the randomly selected accident data, then it applies the
selected controls and obtains the new Severity of Losses. The percent difference in these
values is the actual percent severity of losses. Although this method of calculation returns
the specific desired metric, the actual measured Severity of Losses values are lost in the
calculation. A few selected runs reveal the actual Severity of Losses for the extreme cost
portfolios: a high-cost portfolio provided a score of 0.08 severity, while a low-cost portfolio
averaged 0.13. These portfolios expected a mean severity reduction between 0.12 and 0.24,
for the low-cost portfolio and between 0.37 and 0.49 for the high-cost portfolio. A single
block of 100,000 flight hours is generated 26 times per iteration, for the approximately
2,600,000 flight hours in 5 years for the force-modernized aircraft in the study.

The

simulation from these 100,000 hour blocks provides the 90% confidence intervals covering
the expected percent severity reduction.
The current framework gives commanders a multitude of possible portfolios from
which to select.

Although the Safety Center originally identified controls while ignoring

the cost, at some point in the selection process cost must become a factor. When observing
actual full portfolios, there are many factors to consider such as the airframes affected, the
DTLOMS areas addressed, and the cost allocation. The tabular data presented in Figures
5.1 and 5.2 show a single portfolio broken down into significant parts.
This table displays many of the issues that a commander must take into consideration
when selecting a portfolio from a set of similar-return options.

Due to the overlapping

confidence intervals about the mean severity reduction for portfolios from $100 million to
$1.5 billion, the Army must choose how to allocate their funds. If portfolios differing by $1
billion likely return comparable reductions, the Army could decide to request the smaller
budget control portfolio and have a better likelihood of receiving funding.
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5.4

Future work
The model framework presented in this analysis is supported by the necessary theory;

however, the desirable recommended numerical results do not appear. In any input-output
process, careful examination to ensure the process uses good input yields the promise of
improved output.

These recommendations for future work focus on improving the input

data.
Better estimates of severity would go a long way to improve results.

To better

illustrate what severity looks like for each airframe, specialized severity functions will
increase the precision for severity in 100,000 flight hours.

A possibility for this is to

consider severity functions that incorporate a severity value of 1.0 within the range of values
(see Figure 5.3).

As with any decision analysis study that incorporates Value-Focused
Example Severity Function
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Fatalities in 100,000 flight hours

Figure 5.3

Example Evaluation Measure

Thinking, the commander's preferences need to be updated to include the preferences of
the most senior level decision maker.

Particularly in the case of these ever-changing

accident-based evaluation measures, a point must be made to reflect the Army's current
goals and values.
Controls, although designed to address specific hazards, may in fact impact other,
similar hazards.

The hazards and associated controls currently in use have all been de-

veloped by airframe. This entire research effort, as well as on-going Army aviation safety
decisions, are based entirely on this set of data. The suspected synergistic interplay between controls and hazards, along with any resultant severity reduction (as first pointed
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out in Section 3.3.1), may provide additional insights as to where to most effectively spend
the safety budget, leading to better safety decisions. It is worth noting that intial observations from this research indicate that overlap in hazard occurrence, and hence overlap
in controls designed to mitigate those hazards, lead to an overall smaller than additive
severity reduction.
By defining a better hazard and control taxonomy, elimination of redundant hazards
and combining overlapping controls would serve to make the search region more compact.
This feature enables significant hazards and controls to be highlighted. Currently a pilot
study exists that addresses the hazards associated with tree-strikes. Apply the analyst's
current test case as an example of how although ASIST evaluated them well, combining
them as much as possible to create more robust controls and hazards will make the program
in general better. Better input yields better output.
As with any analysis, the more precise the input, the less the uncertainty of the
output. For this study, ASIST identified controls without regard for the possible cost of
implementing these. Decision makers will definitely consider cost as a factor; the better the
cost estimates, the more realistic these portfolios of controls can be. Because the current
estimates are only measures of magnitude, it is important to refine the cost estimates to
better budget controls.
There is potentially a need for additional research to normalize the systems based on
something other than flight hours because the likelihood of accidents is not based on use,
but also on type of use.
5.4-1

Expanded Applications.

This study, although it specifically addresses Army

aviation, has many applications for other services as well as the aviation industry.

The

safety community commonly categorizes conditions and correction factors into hazards and
controls.

By incorporating the severity measure, identifying hazards and controls, and

evaluating severity reduction, this methodology expands a framework that may be used
on multiple other systems. The effort to modify thinking to address severity, rather than
accident rate, will help the related safety organizations to identify their primary concerns
under multiple competing objectives for quantifying severity of accidents.
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Support for

severity as a measure has been developed in other sectors of safety research to include (28).
This view of accident safety enables leaders and commanders to make better decisions by
evaluating the effectiveness of controls in reducing accident severity.
Adding the evaluation of all accident cases in terms of hazard conditions, as the
Army is now proposing, prepares the service to select controls by this quantitative and
qualitative method.

The Federal Aviation Administration has pursued accident safety

with a hazard focus in their 1998 study "Safer Skies: A Focused Agenda" which identified
the important factors in accidents (12). Their approach successfully identified focal issues
for commercial aviation safety; studing possible controls and a quantitative estimation of
effectiveness is the next logical step. This expanded case study for the Army Safety Center
shows how hazard and control data, a severity value model, and a simulation can be used
with heuristic techniques to select sets of controls to apply for the reduction in aviation
accident severity.
As the U.S. Air Force also seeks to improve its safety, this methodology takes the focus
off of possible alternatives and places it on reducing the important factors affecting aviation
accident severity. The Army has integrated multiple rotary wing systems to obtain a single
overall severity reduction measure; likewise, the Air Force can use safety publications to
establish a multiple objective accident severity model and evaluate its systems.

The

integration of bootstrapping using simulation and portfolio selection based on an initial
surrogate objective function with associated extrapolated regions allows commanders to
look at the alternatives as evaluated based on their achievement of the goal: severity
reduction.

5.5

The Finale
The methodology provides a defensible way that individual controls may be priori-

tized. However, overall accident interactions cannot be simply quantified using an additive
model, a simulation technique best incorporates the uncertainty. The audacious goal that
the Army set may be achievable for individual aircraft; however, this study reveals that
an exorbitant amount of funds would likely not consistently produce the desired results
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Overall. Finally, improvements made to individual parts of the model to better estimate
inputs can only result in improved recommendations and possible portfolios.
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Appendix A. Severity Functions
The support for the severity evaluation measures are developed in Chapter III; this appendix develops the single dimensional severity functions for each evaluation measure. A
single dimensional value function is constructed such that the preferred level receives a 1,
and the least preferred level receives a 0 (19:61). Working with the Army Safety Center,
severity is modeled similarly; however, the least severe situation is most desirable, receiving a zero. Likewise, the most severe accident situation is least desirable, receiving a one.
This description is clearly understood and supported by the leadership at the Safety Center. The following description of individual value function ranges are based on simulation,
the shape of the curves are based on interviews with experts, and the final overall approval
given by the ORSA Division Chief, MAJ Sperling.
At the time of elicitation, the following officers at the Safety Center provided input
in the area of their expertise for the Severity functions. Casualties and total costs severity
functions were developed with COL Warren, USASC Deputy Commander. Unit readiness
severity functions were developed with prior battalion commander, LTC Semmens, USASC
Executive Officer. Finally, LTC Gleisberg, USASC Judge Advocate General developed the
environmental damage severity functions because of his background in environmental law.
In order to obtain a worst case range estimate, ten thousand simulated blocks of 100,000
flight hours were observed to find the maximum range for each measure.

A.l

Casualties
The following severity functions use Army officers' preferences and Army accident

data to assess the severity of casualties for 100,000 flight hours in the selected Force Modernized Aircraft.
A. 1.1

Loss of Life.

The loss any soldier is tragic.

severity of a lost life is extremely difficult.
each soldier is equally important.

Adequately quantifying the

COL Warren expressed that, to the Army,

A linear relationship between lives lost and severity

best describes the Army perspective (13:30).
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From observation of the fatalities present in the data addressed by ASIST, slightly
less than 2 lives lost per 100,000 flight hours is expected. Simulation shows an expected
maximum observable number of fatalities for 100,000 flight hours to be 23. Consequently
the range of incidents for fatalities in 100,000 flight hours is 0 to 23 fatalities in 100,000
flight hours for the Force Modernized Aircraft.

10

15

Lives Lost
Figure A.l

A.1.2
infrequently.

Severity Function of Evaluation Measure - Fatalities

Permanent Total Disabilities.

Permanent total disabilities occur very

In fact, there are no observed cases of permanent total disabilities for the

AH-64, the H-47, the OH-58D and the UH-60 during FY94 through FY98.

Occurrences

of this type of casualty did occur in other airframes during this time period, and they
have occurred in incidents involving the force modernized aircraft during different periods
of time.

For the value model, the necessary evaluation of the severity function is based

on preferences and experience of commanders. Noting the severity of a single permanent
total disability at 0.75, an increase of each additional total disability is linear. The range
for permanent total disabilities is 0 to 6 permanent total disabilities based on historical
data in other time periods.
A. 1.3

Permanent Partial Disabilities.

This severity function captures the impact

of permanent partial disabilities. Similar to the tragic incidence of loss of life, an occurrence
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Figure A.2

Severity Function of Evaluation Measure - Permanent Total Disabilities

of permanent partial disabilities effectively causes the Army to lose a soldier. The inability
to serve in the same capacity is felt by the Army, and each permanent partial disability
that occurs is equally as severe in the judgement of the Army (13:31).

The ASIST data

does contain occurrences of this type of casualty and its severity is based on a range of 0
to 4 permanent partial disabilities.

1-,

OS

>>

+->

• rt

OS

>
02
0

()

05

1

IS

2

25

3

35

<

Permanent Partial Disabilities
Figure A.3

A. 1-4

Severity Function of Evaluation Measure - Permanent Partial Disabilities

Time Incapacitated.

To measure the loss the Army experiences from a

single injured soldier, time incapacitated is scored in terms of the total days soldiers spend
A-3

in the hospital as a result of accidents. The Army views each day hospitalized as equally
severe; a linear response describes the relationship between days hospitalized and severity
(13:31). The accident data and simulation suggest the range for time incapacitated to be
0 to 153 days of hospitalization for 100,000 flight hours.

Figure A.4

A.2

Severity Function of Evaluation Measure - Time Incapacitated

Unit Readiness
The severity functions that evaluate unit readiness focus on the battalion level. Eval-

uating the impact of accidents on a single unit's readiness means developing the impact
that accidents have on training execution, unit morale, and equipment availability.

Be-

cause the model evaluates severity for 100,000 flight hours for the force modernized aircraft,
no distinction is made between the types of units the aircraft belong to. This enables us
to focus on Army impact while addressing unit issues. The information that these severity functions are based upon was elicited from LTC Semmens, a prior aviation battalion
commander. This input provided excellent guidance for relative relationships to severity
concerning the issues impacting a unit.

Consequently, his input is used as a guide, no

specific data points were elicited; future expanded studies should ideally include a complete
elicitation from a group of battalion commanders (13:32).
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A.2.1

Training Execution.

As accidents within a unit increase, a commander

may reduce the training frequency, complexity, and realism in an effort to reduce additional
accidents. This measure combines the number of accidents that happen within a unit and
the class of those accidents.

A battalion commander may tend to be more or less risk

averse depending on the class of the accidents.

It is estimated that he would be as risk

averse for three class C accidents as he would be for one class A accident. The following
provide a scale for measuring one accident of the specified class (13:33):

• Class A accident = 3
• Class B accident = 2
• Class C accident = 1
The category for evaluation is determined by accounting for the class of the accident
multiplied by the number of occurrences within the unit.

For example, if a certain unit

had two accidents in 100,000 flight hours, one class A accident and one class B accident,
the training execution category would be 5. If another unit had two class C accidents, the
training execution category would be 2. The severity assigned to each category can be seen
in figure A.5. The largest increase occurs between categories 2 and 4. This indicates that
a commander would be slightly risk averse if a single class C or class B accident occurred in
their unit; however, if a class A accident or multiple class B and class C accidents occurred,
the commander would likely become more risk averse.

The result of his risk aversion is

a reduction in training execution, consequently more accidents and the higher the class of
those accidents within a single unit the greater the severity.

Little increase in severity

occurs above category 6 because it is assumed that a commander would, by this point have
already reduced training dramatically (13:33).
The range of categories, 0 to 9, is based on simulated likely combinations of accident
classes and amounts.
A.2.2

Unit Morale.

Unit readiness is affected by unit morale.

High morale

often results in better work and fewer accidents; as unit morale degrades, unit readiness
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Severity Function of Evaluation Measure - Unit Training Execution

decreases. Within this analysis, unit morale is made up of two parts, lives lost in unit and
magnitude of injury.
A.2.2.1

Lives Lost in Unit.

The severity function for lives lost in unit

is difficult due to significant differing opinion among commanders.

Using Monte Carlo

simulations of the model, it was found that 9 fatalities in a single unit for 100,000 Army
flight hours is extremely rare, but possible. A few lives lost in a unit is extremely difficult,
but manageable. However, the general feeling is that each increasing life lost would affect
a unit by an increasing amount.

This measure evaluates the impact on morale; it does

not indicate the relative importance or value of life (13:34).
A.2.2.2

Magnitude of Injury.

The measure magnitude of inj ury approached

unit morale from the perspective of the survivors of an accident, the soldiers whose lives
were spared.

Because level of injury is difficult to quantify, the standard for evaluating

the category follows:
Table A.l
Category
Category
Category
Category

0
1
2
3

Injury Category Classification

No injuries requiring hospitalization
Injuries requiring < 7 days hospitalization
Injuries requiring > 7 days hospitalization, no permanent disabilities
Injuries resulting in permanent disabilities
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Figure A.6

Severity Function of Evaluation Measure - Lives Lost in Unit

Severity for these categories is based on the impact fellow soldiers' injuries have
on unit morale.

A brief stay in the hospital has no significant impact on unit morale.

Slightly more severe injuries that require a long hospital stay may decrease the morale and
the severity for category 2 is approximately two times the severity of category 1. Finally,
the most severe injuries are the ones resulting in permanent disabilities.

Soldiers being

injured this severe on duty tend to be remembered by the remaining soldiers in the unit
(13:35).
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A.2.3 Equipment Availability.
ment that is addressed.

In this case, aircraft alone are the type of equip-

Aircraft are deemed unavailable if an accident renders them a

total loss, meaning they are not economically repairable, or if they require more than 40
hours of maintenance to repair.

Using Monte Carlo simulation and the ASIST accident

data, the expected range of unavailable aircraft in one unit is 0 to 3.

Because typical

units may begin to feel the most impact after the loss of two aircraft, the largest increase
in severity occurs between the unavailability of two and three aircraft (13:36).
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A.2.4

Severity Function of Evaluation Measure - Available Equipment, Aircraft

Total Costs.

the dollar cost to the Army.

The investigative team evaluates the accidents in terms of
Total Costs include repair or replacement of the damaged

aircraft, cost of injuries and hospitalizations, and damage costs. The ASIST data enables
the use of Monte Carlo simulation to find the largest possible cost for 100,000 Army flight
hours.

When assessing the severity of dollars, each dollar is equally important, a linear

relationship applies. The range for total cost is $0 to $99 million; as total cost increases,
severity increases (13:37).
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Severity Function of Evaluation Measure - Total Costs

A.3 Environmental Damage
Currently accident investigations estimate spillage using categories, listed below.
The ranges for the categories are the same for all hazardous fluids: fuel, hydraulic fluid,
and oil (9:2-11).
Table A.2
Category
Category
Category
Category
Category
Category

0
1
2
3
4
5

Hazardous Fluid Spills Classification

No hazardous fluid spilled
Less than 1 gallon of hazardous fluid spilled
More than 1 gallon, but less than 2 gallons
More than 2 gallons, but less than 10 gallons
More than 10 gallons, but less than 20 gallons
More than 20 gallons spilled

When evaluating the environmental damage occurring in 100,000 flight hours, use
the category of the maximum spillage occurrence.

This worst-case evaluation estimates

the environmental damage severity conservatively.
A. 3.1

Soil Damage.

Spillage and damage to the soil is assessed by the amount

spilled, using the previously defined categories. Currently LTC Gleisburg expressed little
difference between the types of hazardous fluid spilled into the soil. Fuel, oil, and hydraulic
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Figure A.10

Severity Function of Evaluation Measure - Spills in Soil: Fuel, Oil and
Hydraulic Fluid Damage

fluid all have the same severity function. A category 5 spill was estimated to be 3 times
as severe as a category 4 spill, see Figure A.10 (13:39).
A.3.2

Water Damage.

Water damage requires different severity functions based

upon the interaction of the hazardous fluid and water. Fuel dissipates very easily in water;
small quantities are negligible, large quantities can be very damaging. Hydraulic fluid and
oil both remain near the surface and do not dissipate in the water, smaller quantities may
be slightly more damaging than small amounts of fuel.

Two separate severity functions

have been developed. For evaluating fuel damage in water, a category 5 spill is 10 times
as severe as a category 4 spill, as described in Figure A. 12.

When evaluating hydraulic

fluid and oil in water, a category 5 spill is only 3 times as severe as a category 4 spill, as
described in Figure A.11 (13:40).

A.4

Severity of Losses Model Weights
After obtaining the severity functions, preferences between the measures are exam-

ined using swing weighting techniques. The leadership of the Safety Center that evaluated
the Severity of Losses placed most importance on casualties and secondly on unit readiness.

Specifically, fatalities contribute the most to the severity of a block of accidents.
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Severity Function of Evaluation Measure - Spills in Water: Oil and Hydraulic Fluid Damage

Accidents lowering the training execution and consequently reducing unit readiness was
weighted second most heavily. Note the minimal weight on environmental damage. This
objective is included because it is very important to the Army; however, at this point
in time, the Safety Center does not have the data available to accurately account for its
contribution.
For a more detailed description of both the severity functions and the elicited weights,
reference Gallan, 2000 or Sperling, 1999.
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Severity Function of Evaluation Measure - Spill in Water: Fuel Damage
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Appendix B. Severity Reduction Simulation
In order to follow the code, it is first necessary to understand the basic framework behind
what is occurring. This appendix with begin with a general overview of what occurs. It
will follow with an in-depth explanation of how the code executes this framework, including
references, by name, to the macros and functions used.
For each portfolio to be analyzed, the {0, 1} portfolio of controls model is examined. It finds the hazards reduced by these controls and creates hazard and effectiveness
lists.

These lists are inputs to the main macro that drives each iteration.

The itera-

tions randomly select a certain number of possible accidents to occur. The accidents are
then randomly drawn from the accident database. Because each accident has associated
hazards that cause the accident or increase its severity, by applying controls that decrease
the severity, we see can gain an approximate decrease in severity that the controls supply.
The severity reduction is recorded for each iteration.

The multiple runs provide a data

set from which the expected value of a portfolio can be obtained.

The expected values

become the inputs for the direct search optimization procedure. Figure B.l represents the
functional flow of calculations within the simulation.

®

/ Possible
/ Accidents
'Distribution ,

Single_Run

Returns 5 year Expected
percent Severity
Reduction

©
I Portfolio
of Controls/

Key:
Functions and Subs
Data and Inputs/

* Get_Haz_and_Eff

Fill_Matrices_and_Array
Returns percent
' Severity Reduction
for 100,000 fit hours
Functim

Rand Draw

Figure B.l

An Overview of the Severity Reduction Simulation
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Possible accidents,
Portfolio location
Figure B.2
B.0.1

A single iteration.

Single_Run

5yr Expected Percent
Severity Reduction

Function Single Run Input and Output
Prior to beginning any simulation, the following data

must be located in worksheets within in Army_FMA_Data.xls:
1. Normalized hazard contributions in "NormAnalysisGroupData"
2. Accident investigation by case number (all types of aircraft) in "AccidentData"
3. Evaluation measure ranges and functions in "EvalMeasuresValues"
The individual hazard assessments for each aircraft are divided by aircraft type into
the worksheets AH64_Data, H47_Data, OH58D_Data, and UH60_Data.

Within each

worksheet, matrices contain hazard assessments, by case number, for Casualties (1), Cost
(2), Frequency (3), and Prevention (4). Individual data matrices for each aircraft contain
three dimensions: case number, hazard identifier, and the number 1 through 4 representing
the type of hazard assessment, as noted above.

This data as generated by the accident

investigation teams and evaluated by ASIST is the foundation for this entire study. For
reference, it is important to note that the H47 information is notional and should be
updated before any decisions are based on this study.
The function Single_Run acts as the parent function called by ©RISK and itself
calling the remaining functions and subroutines. Ultimately, the objective of this function
is to take in the distribution of the possible accident rate and to produce a 90% confidence
interval for the range of reduction possible by using the specified portfolio.
Single_Run calls the subroutine Get_Haz_and_Eff to obtain the hazards and effectiveness of the portfolio of controls.
Single_Run also calls the function Do_A_Rep which returns the average percent
severity reduction of a set of runs representing 26 blocks of 100,000 flight hours, or five
years of FMA flight.
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Function Do A Replication Input and Output

Function Do_A_Rep calls Fill_Matrices_and_Arrays which takes the given aircraft data from the individual workbooks and stores all of the data in dimensioned matrix
form in the program's memory. This procedure increases the speed of processing information.

Fill_Matrices_and_Arrays is only called for the first iteration of Do_A_Rep; all

subsequent iterations recognize the data in memory and proceed with calculations.
Do_A_Rep performs iterations obtaining the percent severity reduction for single
observations of blocks representing 100,000 flight hours.

The force modernized aircraft

addressed by this study flew over 550,000 flight hours in FY2000.

The number of hours

flown during FY94 through FY98, sum to over 2,500,000 flight hours.

By simulating 26

blocks of 100,000 flight hours, a mean severity reduction for the 5 observed years can be
obtained. In order to simulate these blocks, Rand_draw must be called.
The objective of this function is to take a random sample of possible accidents and
test the improvement gained by applying a certain portfolio of controls.

User input data

Fill Matrices and Arrays

worksheets
Figure B.5

Of all possible

Each HXX Matrix,
FMA_Data_Matrix,
and Weights

►

Subroutine Fill Matrices and Arrays Input and Output
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Function Random Draw Input and Output

accidents, the specified number are selected, the effectiveness applied and the severity score
calculated with and without new controls. The percent difference between these severity
scores is the value returned to Do_A_Rep.
Do_A_Rep takes the single severity reduction observations and averages them to
obtain a value, the mean severity reduction, to return to Single_Run. The value obtained
from this simulation is used by the optimization.
This spreadsheet tool has user-friendly macros that will enable the sponsor to format
their data an use this simulation technique in the future.
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Appendix C.

Control Lists for Force-Modernized Aircraft

The following controls were defined by ASIST to reduce hazards for the following aircraft.
Table C.l

Abbrevations for Control Lists

Abbreviation
org
trg
ldr dev
doct

C.l

DTLOMS Area
organization
training
leadership development
doctrine

Control List for the AH-64 Apache

CONTROL

CONTROL STATEMENT

DTLOMS

COST

AH64-C01

Modify force trim switch (no off position).

Materiel

Low

AH64-C02

Amend -10 warning.

Materiel

Nil

AH64-C03

Retrofit ECP0887 (cyclic bellcrank counterweights).

Materiel

Low

AH64-C04

Mechanical Stop tied to Squat Switch (operative dur-

Materiel

Medium

ing shutdown)
AH64-C05

Improved flight control system (ACAH+ Hover hold).

Materiel

Medium

AH64-C06

Second generation FLIR.

Materiel

High

AH64-C07

Obstacle/wire/ground proximity warning device.

Materiel

High

AH64-C08

" Family of Virtual Rotor Disk/Prox Warning System"

Materiel

AH64-C09

Revisit external stores jettison protocols and restric-

Doctrine

VLow

Training

VLow

tions
AH64-C10

Develop, monitor and evaluate a Crew Coordination
Sustainment Training program integrated into all aviation tasks

AH64-C11

Standardized multi-aircraft mission abort

Training

VLow

AH64-C12

Hands on inadvertent IMC Training either in the sim-

Training

VLow

ulator or aircraft
AH64-C13

Pre-brief on inadvertent IMC contigency

Doctrine

High

AH64-C14

Increase Flying Hour Program

Org

VLow

C-l

CONTROL

CONTROL STATEMENT

DTLOMS

COST

AH64-C15

Improve FLIR condition forecasting techniques

Materiel

VLow

AH64-C16

Enhance risk management training

Training

Low

AH64-C17

Envelope cueing (exceedances).

Materiel

Medium

AH64-C18

Digital source collector and develop procedures for use

Materiel

Medium

of FDR data by commanders for aircrew training
AH64-C19

Develop tools to help commanders identify high risk

Ldr Dev

behavior
AH64-C20

Modifying flight symbology (VSI)

Materiel

Low

AH64-C21

Digital Source Collector (DSC) and envelope cueing

Materiel

High

(exceedences) and notice to pilot of exceedences/crew
monitor
AH64-C22

Improve PNVS

Materiel

High

AH64-C23

Flight Symbology (velocity vector k VSI) overlay on

Materiel

Low

Doctrine

VLow

Training

VLow

TADS
AH64-C24

Standards or guidance for risk assessment articulation
for cummulative risk

AH64-C25

Make an evaluation task (hovering in close prox to
terrain, degraded visual environment, and high workload)*** DES Clarification

AH64-C26

Family of controls for vision enhancement systems

Materiel

AH64-C27

Integrate improved night vision goggle system and

Materiel

Low

training for CPG
AH64-C28

Fence existing flying hour dollars

Training

Nil

AH64-C29

Standardize use of ERFS (restrict for theater self de-

Doctrine

Nil

ployment - including train ups - or ferry missions only)
through doctrinal change
AH64-C30

Acquire crashworthy ERFS

Materiel

AH64-C31

Communicate HQDA acceptance of risk for current use

Org

of ERFS

C-2

Nil

CONTROL

CONTROL STATEMENT

DTLOMS

COST

AH64-C32

Install fire detection and suppression in T-back area

Materiel

Medium

Materiel

Medium

Materiel

Low

Materiel

Nil

Materiel

Low

to include the forward area
AH64-C33

Install new APU clutch w/ disengage feature (oneway).

AH64-C34

Develop new anti-flail containment for APU drive
shaft.

AH64-C35

Integrate new anti-flail containment for APU drive
shaft into Drive train 2000

AH64-C36

Integrate new APU clutch w/ disengage feature (oneway) into Drive train 2000

AH64-C37

Redesign APU clutch

Materiel

Medium

AH64-C38

Mandatory replacement with new yellow harness

Materiel

VLow

AH64-C39

Establish requirement for emergency procedure train-

Training

Nil

Org

VLow

ing for single engine failure in the Combat Mission
Simulator (Increase awareness of high side or low side
failures )
AH64-C40

Increase & improve data captured for Class C accidents through the use of DA 2397 forms

AH64-C41

Shroud tail-rotor

Materiel

High

AH64-C42

Standardize doctrine and operational procedures for

Doctrine

Medium

Org

VLow

Org

VLow

mulit-ship operations involving mixed night vision systems, including associated training (flight and simulator)
AH64-C43

Defer to USAALS to look at maintenance related controls to reduce FOD hazards associated with tools

AH64-C44

Defer to USAALS to look at maintenance related controls to reduce hazards associated with maintenance
discipline

C-3

CONTROL

CONTROL STATEMENT

DTLOMS

COST

AH64-C45

Increase damage tolerance of aircraft

Materiel

High

AH64-C46

Emphase proper pilot reaction to impending bird

Training

VLow

strike (maintain steady flight)
AH64-C47

Cockpit indication of component security

Materiel

Medium

AH64-C48

Value engineering study of fasteners

Materiel

VLow

AH64-C49

Safety Latch (mechanical secondary latch for the tail

Materiel

Low

Training

Nil

rotor driveshaft cover)
AH64-C50

Establish improved technique (as part of preflight) to
physically ensure integrity of cowlings

AH64-C51

Redesign/upgrade of latching devices

Materiel

Low

AH64-C52

Require correct size cam locks be installed in each ap-

Training

Nil

Materiel

VLow

plication
AH64-C53

USAALS evaluate possible elimination of multiple size
cam locks

AH64-C54

Paint leading edge of engine cowling day glow orange

Materiel

Nil

AH64-C55

Book of Hazards and Controls

Training

VLow

AH64-C56

Establish a command information system which tracks

Materiel

Low

Ldr Dev

Nil

Org

Low

Training

VLow

all forms of high risk behavior and marginal performance
AH64-C57

Modify AR 95-3 to require that mission planning time
is considered as mandatory topic for risk determination and establish risk management standards for mission planning time

AH64-C58

Integrate risk management training into aviation officer/WO/NCO development programs (use accident
experience as part of the training)

AH64-C59

Develop a standardized methodology for conducting
mission risk assessments with the objective for identification of all hazards and associated controls to be
presented in the mission brief
C-4

CONTROL CONTROL STATEMENT

DTLOMS COST

AH64-C60

Training

VLow

Training

VLow

Training

VLow

Training

VLow

Establish model RM training program, starting with
DAIG evaluation of all institutional training schools
for integration of risk management training into curriculum

AH64-C61

Establish minimum training requirements (concerning
seleced enforcement of aviation maintenance and operations standards) for assignment as commanders (integration into advanced course, an exportable training
package, and modifying BOC and AOC)

AH64-C62

Establish or enforce selection criteria for advanced aviator training

AH64-C63

Increase command emphasis (Advance Course) on
safety incentives

AH64-C64

Evaluate AH-64 maintenance force structure.

Org

VLow

AH64-C65

Provide an effective back-up control system (no tran-

Materiel

High

sients, redundancy, transparent -equivalent control feel
and response)
AH64-C66

Reactivate BUCS

Materiel

Medium

AH64-C67

Remove BUCS (Consider Red Team for mishap data

Materiel

Low

Materiel

High

Materiel

Low

and effectiveness rating)
AH64-C68

Redesign primary flight control system to military
specification (redundancy, ballistic tolerance, and
strength requirement)

AH64-C69

Reactivate BUCS in pre PV 529 aircraft and AH64D
lot 1 a/c

AH64-C70

Re-orient direction of swage pin

Materiel

VLow

AH64-C71

Redesign tail rotor control to provide fixed medium

Materiel

Medium

pitch setting equivalent to nominal thrust to transition
to controlled flight and controlled landing (rewrite -10
for new emergency procedure)
C-5

CONTROL

CONTROL STATEMENT

DTLOMS

COST

AH64-C72

Install a new design strap pack with an established

Materiel

Medium

Materiel

VLow

service life
AH64-C73

Revise and enforce government oversight procedures
(AR 95-20)

AH64-C74

Revise -23 with new NDI inspection and procedures

Materiel

VLow

AH64-C75

Redesign refuel nozzle to include visual locking indi-

Materiel

Low

Training

Low

Materiel

Low

cation
AH64-C76

Increase emphasis on assembly of refueling equipment
and hot refueling during POL operator training (initial
training and new requirement for recurring qualification training and annual recertification)

AH64-C77

Provide Personal Protective Equipment to POL handlers

AH64-C78

Install cockpit airbag system

Materiel

High

AH64-C79

Install MA-16 inertia reels

Materiel

VLow

AH64-C80

Cooler search light bulb

Materiel

Low

AH64-C81

Install heat shield for search light

Materiel

Low

AH64-C82

Add a light on the caution advisory panel to indicate

Materiel

Low

search light condition (on/off)
AH64-C83

Install Flight Data Recorder

Materiel

Medium

AH64-C84

Pressurize cockpit to redirect airflow out of the cockpit

Materiel

Medium

AH64-C86

Redesign internal fuel system (baffled system)

Materiel

Medium

AH64-C87

Install air tolerant fuel pump (bubble eating pump)

Materiel

Medium

AH64-C88

Redesign fuel transfer system to a fuel suction system

Materiel

Medium

AH64-C89

Install automatic external fuel transfer shutoff prior to

Materiel

Medium

Materiel

Medium

Materiel

Medium

ingestion of air
AH64-C90

Install automatic fuel management system (including
management of aux fuel)

AH64-C92

Obstacle detection system

C-6

CONTROL

CONTROL STATEMENT

AH64-C94

Establish lot accept testing controls for aircraft ord-

DTLOMS

COST

Materiel

Low

Ldr Dev

VLow

Ldr Dev

Low

Ldr Dev

VLow

nance
AH64-C95

Command emphasis campaign from HQDA(CSA),
Aviation Branch Chief, and Aviation principals to enforce standards

AH64-C96

Study and establish minimum operational experience
and flight time requirements for selection as aviation
commander

AH64-C97

Provide training through Pre-command Course to
increase awareness of need for Bn Commander to
broaden junior officer development - management of
flying hour program and risk management

C.2

Control List for the H-47 Chinook

CONTROL

CONTROL STATEMENT

DTLOMS

COST

H47-C01

Enhanced risk management training at all levels of

Training

VLow

Materiel

Medium

command
H47-C02

Obstacle collision warning system which includes provisions for Pi-adjustable parameters.

H47-C03

Increase pilot flight hours and supervision

Training

Medium

H47-C04

Digital source collector and develop procedure for use

Materiel

Medium

of DSC data by commanders for aircrew training.
H47-C05

WSPS

Materiel

Medium

H47-C06

Crew coordination sustainment training

Training

Low

H47-C07

Back-up DC (battery)-powered IMC instruments

Materiel

Low

H47-C08

Install state-of-the-art waterproof circuit breaker

Materiel

Low

H47-C09

Seal fuselage to prevent water intrusion

Materiel

VLow

H47-C10

Redesign fuselage to prevent water intrusion

Materiel

High

C-7

CONTROL

CONTROL STATEMENT

DTLOMS

COST

H47-C11

Increase manning levels to match present operations in

Soldiers

High

Training

Low

Materiel

VLow

Materiel

VLow

Org

Low

Org

Low

Materiel

Low

Training

Nil

Doctrine

VLow

Training

Nil

aviation units, considering non-aviation requirements
H47-C12

Develop and provide training to commanders to match
crew experience with mission requirements to include
risk management training

H47-C13

Reverify 240-23 flight control hardware installation
against H-47D production drawings

H47-C14

Training for CCAD personnel in CH-47-peculiar maintenance practices

H47-C15

Increase technical oversight of the maintenance manual
(increase personnel)

H47-C16

Increase PEO/PM/AMCOM system dedicated field
representation to provide technical oversight and operational feedback.

H47-C17

Add ground proximity (squat) switches to forward
landing gear which limits responsiveness of control input

H47-C18

add warning to dash 10 for limits on upslope landing
to include adding forward cyclic while on upslope

H47-C19

Develop risk assessment procedure for waivers to AR
95-1 requirements.

Process Issue: Need to change

waiver process into a risk management process
H47-C20

Standardize cargo release operations, with a change to
the ATM, mandating use of hot mike during external
operations whenever master cargo hook is activated.

H47-C21

improved design of cargo release switch

Materiel

Low

H47-C22

Modify AR 95-1 to mandate seatbelt usage when not

Training

Nil

performing flight crew duties,
aircraft)

C-8

(may apply to other

CONTROL

CONTROL STATEMENT

DTLOMS

COST

H47-C23

Change phase maintenance manual requiring bench

Materiel

VLow

Materiel

Low

test of AFCS computer at phase.
H47-C24

Modify -23 to establish TBO for integrated lower control actuators (ILCAs) and review adequacy of upper
boost actuators (UBAs) TBO

H47-C25

Develop emergency procedure for flight control lockup

Training

VLow

H47-C26

Modify flight control system to provide inflight indi-

Materiel

High

Materiel

Low

Org

Nil

cation of Integrated Lower Control Actuator (ILCA)
and Upper Boost Actuator (UBA) jams
H47-C27

Develop and implement new Army Oil Analysis Program (AOAP) procedure for hydraulic fluid analysis

H47-C28

Develop new standards to increase number of fastrope
crew members for missions

H47-C29

Redesign HAR refeuling probe

Materiel

High

H47-C30

Change SOP responsibility for search light controls to

Training

Nil

Mat/Trg

Low

flight engineer
H47-C31

Develop and train HAR refueling scenerio in a high
fidelity simulatior

H47-C32

Improve tanker cueing

Materiel

Medium

H47-C33

Install day and night remote viewing devices to view

Materiel

Low

cargo hook operations
H47-C34

4 axis hover hold

Materiel

Medium

H47-C35

Install winchable hook assemblies

Materiel

High

H47-C36

Modify -10 to mandate 4th crew member for sling load

Soldiers

Low

operations
H47-C37

automated approach landing system (improved FCS)

Materiel

Medium

H47-C38

Information system to provide realtime weather at unit

Materiel

VLow

Materiel

High

operations
H47-C39

Second generation FLIR

C-9

CONTROL

CONTROL STATEMENT

DTLOMS

COST

H47-C40

update ATM TC1-216 to include landing procedures

Training

Nil

Doctrine

Nil

Doctrine

Nil

Training

VLow

Doctrine

Nil

for various terrain
H47-C41

Mandate a regulatory requirement to ensure airfields
are marked IAW TM 5-803-4 and deviations published
in FLIR

H47-C42

Modify appropriate TM to require marking of all potential hazards/obstacles.

H47-C43

Modify MOS program for 67U to include academic/practical training for ground guide/wing walker
responsibilities.

H47-C44

Pre-mission briefing of all expected hazards and controls to be used.

H47-C45

audio volume control on low altitude warning

Materiel

VLow

H47-C46

terrain avoidance radar (coupled into FCS)

Materiel

High

H47-C47

Reinstitute ATM Task 1078 (Unusual Attitude Recov-

Materiel

High

ery) for VMC
H47-C48

Develop an emergency flight control response limiter

Materiel

High

H47-C49

improved NVG

Materiel

Low

H47-C50

Increase information recorded on accident forms, use

Doctrine

VLow

DA-2397 series forms.
H47-C51

Command emphasis

Ldr Dev

Nil

H47-C52

Develop a better debris detection system using "full-

Materiel

Low

Training

VLow

flow" technology.
H47-C53

Develop a mean or reporting deployability status of
mission equipment (ERFS)

H47-C54

Change location of N2 speed feedback assembly

Materiel

Medium

H47-C55

Accident scenarios in simulator

Training

Nil

H47-C56

Design provisions for protective stowage of the cargo

Materiel

Low

release switch

C-10

CONTROL

CONTROL STATEMENT

DTLOMS

COST

H47-C57

Install DSC in all H-47

Materiel

Medium

H47-C58

Improve existing non-slip surface

Materiel

Nil

H47-C59

"dead man" ramp control switch

Materiel

VLow

H47-C60

Accelerate installation of ECP D229

Materiel

Low

H47-C61

accelerate installation of MWO 55-1520-240-50-52

Materiel

Low

Materiel

Medium

combat lighting
H47-C62

accelerate installation of the collector gear cartridge
ECP

H47-C63

Accelerate installation of the older style (-5) fan shaft

Materiel

Medium

H47-C64

ASAM-99-02

Materiel

Nil

H47-C65

Better troubleshooting procedures

Training

VLow

H47-C66

Clarify SOPs (Ranger vs. 160th)

Training

Nil

H47-C67

Clear crew coordination

Training

Nil

H47-C68

Combat engineers survey and maintain areas for flight

Org

High

Training

Nil

Materiel

Low

operations
H47-C69

Communication plan (Ship to ground as well as ship
to ship)

H47-C70

Complete with an adequate MWO to address the spirit
of the Boeing bulletin

H47-C72

Crew and Pax briefings

Training

Nil

H47-C73

cross training of Crewchiefs and Fast-Rope Safeties

Training

Nil

H47-C74

Develop a quick and easy reference to develop LZ sizes

Training

Nil

for diferent aircraft
H47-C75

Develop a wear indicator gage

Materiel

Low

H47-C76

Develop crew member emergency procedure training

Training

VLow

Training

Nil

in simulator
H47-C77

Develop FE/CE requirement in TC 1-216 to obtain PI
clearance to lower ramp after landing.

C-ll

CONTROL

CONTROL STATEMENT

DTLOMS

COST

H47-C78

Develop policies and procedures for weather risk man-

Training

VLow

agement decisions through unit operations center (to
include maintenance operations)
H47-C79

Develop procedure to track maintenance trends

Doctrine

Nil

H47-C80

Emergency procedure standardization during mainte-

Training

Nil

Training

Nil

Materiel

Nil

Materiel

Low

Soldiers

Medium

nance test flights.
H47-C81

Enhance communication between Fast Rope Master
and Safety

H47-C82

Enhance crew coordination (call out for arming and
alert caution to release button) with caution box in
the ATM

H47-C83

Ensure chip detector design and location is appropriate
to indicate presence of metal particles in the oil

H47-C84

Establish a maintenance FE position for maintenance
test flights

H47-C85

Establish overhaul interval for APU

Materiel

Medium

H47-C86

Etching on the striker plate to provide indication of

Materiel

Low

wear
H47-C87

Folding rotor system (SH-60)

Materiel

High

H47-C89

harnesses for flight engineers to help with leverage

Materiel

Medium

H47-C90

Highlight striker plate wear as an emphasis item in

Training

Nil

Training

N/A

preflight
H47-C91

Identify and track special classification for potentially
hazardous conditions

H47-C92

Improve avionics door latch

Materiel

Low

H47-C93

Improve crew coordination/planning for emergency

Training

Nil

situations

C-12

CONTROL

CONTROL STATEMENT

DTLOMS

COST

H47-C94

Improve handling characteristics at high speed flight

Materiel

High

Materiel

High

Training

Nil

Materiel

Medium

Ldr Dev

Nil

by providing means to fine tune speed management or
improve AFCS
H47-C95

Improve NVD (field of view and visual acuity) to help
identify closure rates

H47-C96

Improve understanding and confidence in navigaion
equipment

H47-C97

improve winch to perform ingress assistance of individual

H47-C99

Incorporate tools in the Risk Management process for
accountability of the increased risk due to lack of funding.

H47-C100

Increase available funding for safety ECPs

Materiel

High

H47-C101

Increase awareness on the ground commander to an-

Training

Nil

ticipate requirements for LZ
H47-C102

Increase emphasis on emergency procedures

Training

Nil

H47-C103

Increase oil capacity

Materiel

Medium

H47-C104

Information system to provide realtime weather at unit

Materiel

Low

operations
H47-C105

Install a backup oil cooling system

Materiel

Medium

H47-C106

Install containment ring around APU

Materiel

Low

H47-C107

Install DSC and HUMS to capture data

Materiel

Medium

H47-C108

Onboard weather avoidance equipment to facilitate

Materiel

Low

Materiel

High

identification of storm cells during flight
H47-C109

Install DSC to capture data to use in clutch performance and TBO determination analysis

H47-C110

Install FADEC

Materiel

High

H47-C111

Install HUMS

Materiel

Medium

C-13

CONTROL

CONTROL STATEMENT

DTLOMS

COST

H47-C112

Install increased de-icing capability on all H-47s

Materiel

High

H47-C113

Install new compressor wheels in APU

Materiel

Low

Training

Nil

Materiel

High

H47-C114

Limit number of winch lift cycles to minimize injury
risk

H47-C115

Load sensor to detect load on ground to allow crew
chief to release load (this control also requires movement of emergency release button and enhanced emergency procedures)

H47-C116

mandate use of metal clevis to reach pendant

Materiel

Nil

H47-C117

Mandatory retrofit of-11 lag dampener

Materiel

Low

H47-C118

Match personnel physical standards with task require-

Organization

Nil

Soldiers

Nil

Materiel

Low

Training

Nil

ments
H47-C119

Match personnel to mission requirement according to
SOP

H47-C120

Modify aircraft to provide greater crew visibility directly beneath the aircraft

H47-C121

Night Vision Devices for FAST Rope Masters and
Safeties

H47-C122

Provide aircrew training on ground resonance

Training

Nil

H47-C123

Provide

Training

Nil

standardized

configuration

for

securing

winch/hoist control grip assembly during external load
operations
H47-C124

reconfigure load (remove blades)

Training

Nil

H47-C125

Redesign engine control system to prevent rotor over-

Materiel

High

speed.

C-14

CONTROL

CONTROL STATEMENT

DTLOMS

COST

H47-C126

Redesign latch to meet operational loads and vibra-

Materiel

Low

tions
H47-C127

Redesign the transmission and oil cooling system

Materiel

High

H47-C129

Remote wireless ramp control

Materiel

Medium

H47-C130

Research new procedures and methods for flight con-

Materiel

Low

trol hydraulic system inspections/maintenance on recurring basis
H47-C131

Operational Risk Management enhancements

Training

VLow

H47-C132

Safety-of-Flight to remove APUs past xxx hrs.

Materiel

Medium

H47-C133

Separate funding from the decision making process

Materiel

Nil

H47-C134

Smart drogue to detect fuel line tension and safely

Materiel

Medium

Training

VLow

Training

Nil

maintain engagement
H47-C136

Symposium or other forums with USAF/USA to highlight division of tasks/hazards/risks/controls associated with HAR

H47-C137

Update TC 1-216 to focus on crew member communication skills

H47-C138

use of high temperature tolerant materials

Materiel

N/A

H47-C139

voice activated communication system

Materiel

Medium

H47-C140

Provide training through Pre-command Course to

Ldr Dev

VLow

Ldr Dev

Low

Ldr Dev

VLow

increase awareness of need for Bn Commander to
broaden junior officer development - management of
flying hour program and risk management
H47-C141

Study and establish minimum operational experience
and flight time requirements for selection as aviation
commander

H47-C142

Command emphasis campaign from HQDA(CSA),
Aviation Branch Chief, and Aviation principals to enforce standards

C-15

C.3

Control List for the OH-58D Kiowa Warrior

CONTROL

CONTROL STATEMENT

DTLOMS

COST

OH58-C01

Relocate CSC to improve visibility/accessibility

Materiel

Low

OH58-C02

Field the improved CSC (voice activated) throughout

Materiel

Low

Materiel

Medium

Materiel

Medium

the fleet to eliminate requirement
OH58-C03

Improved Flight Control System (FCS) - Attitude
Command Attitude Hold (ACAH) + Hover Hold

OH58-C04

Obstacle warning device that identifies direction of obstacles (virtual rotor disc)

OH58-C05

Digital Source Collector (DSC)/Voice recorder

Materiel

Medium

OH58-C06

Provide pilot capability to focus outside for all tasks

Materiel

Medium

(Day/night/NVG HUD with weapons and flight symbology)
OH58-C07

Articulated weapons pylons

Materiel

High

OH58-C08

Improved ANVIS resolution, acuity, and FOV

Materiel

Low

OH58-C09

Crew coordination sustainment training

Training

Low

OH58-C10

Field a high fidelity simulator and develop accident

Materiel

High

Ldr Dev

VLow

Org

High

avoidance scinerio for simulator training
OH58-C11

Enhance risk management policy to provide feedback
for reassessments to commander/decision maker as
conditions change

OH58-C12

Increase aircrew experience (flying hour program and
increase proficiency minimums) - increase avg exp from
400 hr to 1000 hr

OH58-C13

Redesign/standardize fuel hose coupling

Materiel

Low

OH58-C14

Improve qualification (MOS) and unit training on all

Training

VLow

Materiel

Low

aviation refueling equipment (USAALS coordination)
OH58-C15

Establish DA program to procure and manage standardized fueling equipment (need to research proponent)

C-16

CONTROL

CONTROL STATEMENT

DTLOMS

COST

OH58-C16

Establish standard in the -10 to disable flight controls

Doctrine

Nil

when the crew station is occupied by non-rated passenger
OH58-C17

Develop and field a wire/obstacle detection system

Materiel

Medium

OH58-C18

Add an audio warning to provide a throttle warning

Materiel

Medium

at 400 feet with throttle at idle
OH58-C20

Improve autorotational characteristics/sink rate

Materiel

High

OH58-C21

Establish a minimum entry altitude for initiation of a

Doct/Trg

Nil

Training

Nil

Training

Low

Training

Nil

Materiel

Medium

Training

Low

simulated engine failure
OH58-C22

Enhance crew coordination task (requiring PI to confirm IP has rolled throttle on-check throttle)

OH58-C23

Increase SEF training(both AQC, IPC/MOI, and unit
training)

OH58-C24

Modify the ATM to make the SEF task a mandatory
part of the mission briefing

OH58-C26

Make landing gear and attachment points more tolerant to hard landings

OH58-C27

Increase

SEF/Autorotation

training(both

AQC,

IPC/MOI, and unit training)
OH58-C29

Materiel modification already applied

Materiel

Zero

OH58-C30

Enforce maintenance standards with command em-

Ldr Dev

Nil

Soldiers

Low

phasis
OH58-C31

Fill the OH-58D maintenance force structure (coordinate with USAALS/PERSCOM)

OH58-C33

Incorporate FADEC fleetwide

Materiel

High

OH58-C34

Include hazards and controls in MOI flight training

Training

Nil

Ldr Dev

Nil

guide
OH58-C35

Enforce procedures with command emphasis

C-17

CONTROL

CONTROL STATEMENT

DTLOMS

COST

OH58-C36

Modify Fighter Management Procedures to include

Ldr Dev

Nil

Materiel

Low

maintenance personnel
OH58-C37

Information system to provide realtime weather at unit
operations (DTN, WSI, NOAA, DUATS)

OH58-C38

Improved aircraft weather detection system

Materiel

High

OH58-C39

Increase power and torque available

Materiel

High

OH58-C40

Install collective soft stop (tactile cueing to provide

Materiel

Medium

Materiel

Medium

Materiel

Medium

Materiel

Medium

overtorque feedback to pilot), including incident reconstruction capability
OH58-C41

Install flight envelop cueing, including incident reconstruction capability

OH58-C42

Ensure retrofit of crashworthy seats is applied to all
aircraft

OH58-C43

Equip left seat collective with RPM trim switch, search
light on-off, and search light control

OH58-C44

Accelerate ECP application

Materiel

Low

OH58-C45

Design a reliable fire detection and suppression system

Materiel

Medium

OH58-C46

Remove SCAS switch from cyclic

Materiel

High

OH58-C47

Resourcing of thermal protective equipment for all

Materiel

Medium

Training

Low

Training

Nil

Training

Nil

77F's
OH58-C48

Strengthen Optical Display Assembly training (both
AQC and unit training)

OH58-C49

Increase minimum hover altitude in unit SOP to 10
feet for operating on rolling ships

OH58-C50

Identify object strike hazards effecting hovering altitudes during orientations, reconnaissances and premission planning for incorporation into unit SOPs and
premission brefings.

OH58-C51

Enforce existing standards and controls

Ldr Dev

Nil

OH58-C52

Change ATM to define height/altitude restriction

Training

VLow

C-18

CONTROL

CONTROL STATEMENT

DTLOMS

COST

OH58-C53

Ensure proper marking of and notification of poten-

Ldr Dev

Nil

Ldr Dev

Nil

Doct/Trg

VLow

tial hazards is provided to aircrews and updated as
necessary during flight operations
OH58-C54

Restrict aircaft flight operations in periods of marginal
weather to those necessary to complete the mission

OH58-C55

Include appropriate markings to indicate aircraft is undergoing maintenance

OH58-C56

Ensure proper IP supervision of students

Training

Nil

OH58-C57

Ensure objects in proximity of aircraft (inside of bal-

Ldr Dev

VLow

Training

Nil

Training

Nil

Training

VLow

Training

VLow

Training

Nil

listic barriers) are properly secured
OH58-C58

Inform aircrew of hazards associated with not using
provided eye protection (visor)

OH58-C59

Ensure aviation unit maintenance personnel are aware
of the QDR program by conductiing initial and recurring training

OH58-C60

Ensure SOPs and policies for precautionary landings
at Ft Rucker are reviewed and understood by Ft
Rucker personnel.

OH58-C61

Ensure information on engine fuel control operation
during engine starts (including degraded modes of operation) is provided in the operator's manual.

OH58-C62

Ensure complete information is incorporated in the operator's manual addressing cyclic lock-out

OH58-C63

Verify communications prior to flight

Training

Nil

OH58-C64

Develop hover training progression to progress to stan-

Training

Nil

Training

Nil

Ldr Dev

Nil

dard
OH58-C65

Warning to inform pilots to hover into the wind in the
event of an emergency

OH58-C66

Command emphasis

C-19

CONTROL

CONTROL STATEMENT

DTLOMS

COST

OH58-C67

Instill self discipline

Ldr Dev

Nil

OH58-C68

Authorized personnel and authorized tools

Org

Low

OH58-C69

Warnings in technical manuals

Training

Low

OH58-C70

Closer attention to flight by tower personnel/TSO

Training

Nil

OH58-C72

Emphasize PPE through existing force protection

Ldr Dev

Nil

OH58-C73

Provide training on standardized fire supression sys-

Training

Nil

Training

Nil

Training

Low

tems for tactical FARP operations
OH58-C74

Changes to unit SOP for shutdown and post flight
inspections after conducting emergency procedures
training.

OH58-C75

Incorporate changes to -10 to highlight upstop conditions

OH58-C76

Education of effects of moisture/ dew point

Training

Nil

OH58-C77

Research Center for Army Lessons Learned for opera-

Ldr Dev

Nil

tional risk management information
OH58-C78

Increase frequency of wire replacement

Doctrine

Nil

OH58-C79

Modify WSPS to preclude wire cutter contact with

Materiel

Low

Ldr Dev

VLow

Ldr Dev

VLow

Ldr Dev

VLow

ground during A/R landings
OH58-C80

Provide training through Pre-command Course to
increase awareness of need for Bn Commander to
broaden junior officer development - management of
flying hour program and risk management

OH58-C81

Study and establish minimum operational experience
and flight time requirements for selection as aviation
commander

OH58-C82

Command emphasis campaign from HQDA(CSA),
Aviation Branch Chief, and Aviation principals to enforce standards
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Control List for the UH-60 Black Hawk

CONTROL

CONTROL STATEMENT

DTLOMS

COST

H60-C01

Add mandatory scenario training in simulator (emer-

Org

Low

gency procedures, power management, brownout) to
include resourcing of TDY
H60-C02

Book of hazards and controls

Soldier

VLow

H60-C03

Change ATM to establish new flying hour category

Doctrine

Low

Materiel

Medium

Ldr Dev

Low

Training

Low

for individual task flight training hours (not collective
training)* and resource individual training.
H60-C04

Develop external crashworthy fuel tanks consider suetion fuel system

H60-C05

Establish a command information system which tracks
all forms of high risk behavior and marginal performance

H60-C06

Establish and sustain crewchief's" school house" training program

H60-C07

Establish crew coordination sustainment program

Training

Low

H60-C08

Establish standards for and resource a 4th crewmem-

Org

Medium

Training

Low

Materiel

Medium

ber for high workload (mulit-ship, night ) operations.
Include in mission planning/briefs/assessment.
H60-C09

Expand

AQC

training

dures/emergency diagnosis,

(emergency

proce-

mulitship operations,

and flight limitations)
H60-C10

Implement a change to the flight control system to improve aircraft stability and control in low speed flight
(Attitude Command Attitude Hold)

H60-C11

Increase the available aircrew experience.

Org

High

H60-C12

quirement to highlight specific controls during the air

Ldr Dev

Nil

mission brief.
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CONTROL

CONTROL STATEMENT

DTLOMS

COST

H60-C13

Provide commanders a better ability for selection, mis-

Ldr Dev

Low

Materiel

Medium

sion tailoring, and balancing of resources to do the
mission
H60-C14

Develop a wire strike protection system that covers
more of the aircraft

H60-C15

Enhance NVG field of view

Materiel

Medium

H60-C16

Develop and field a proximity warning system (Virtual

Materiel

Medium

Materiel

Low

Training

VLow

Training

VLow

Materiel

High

Rotor Disk)
H60-C17

Fund and install flight data recorder (FDR) for accident and incident investigation.

H60-C18

Increase command emphasis (Advance Course) on
safety incentives

H60-C19

Modify AR 95-3 or TC 1-210 to require 2 hours annually of actual instruments for each PIC

H60-C20

Develop and field an adjustable proximity warning system/collision avoidance.

H60-C21

Develop a terrain following / terrain avoidance radar

Materiel

High

H60-C22

Develop standardized training support package for use

Materiel

VLow

at unit level targeted on ERFS operations to include
simulator scenario training, jettison stores, a/c performance characteristics
H60-C23

Manual changes to describe handling characteristics

Materiel

VLow

H60-C24

Develop and install new Night Vision Systems

Materiel

Medium

H60-C25

Improve aircraft controllability with tanks installed

Materiel

Low

Materiel

High

Materiel

High

(pitch bias actuator, digital stabilator amp)
H60-C26

Improve IFR/IMC infrastructure in selected parts of
the world (ABSO define)

H60-C27

Wire detection system using laser radar or HF radar
technology

C-22

CONTROL CONTROL STATEMENT

DTLOMS COST

H60-C28

Materiel

High

Materiel

High

Materiel

Medium

Resource aviation maintenance IAW reference XYX to
match requirements of complex aircraft, (link to USAALS needed to consider dedicated crews to aircraft)

H60-C29

Full authority DEC automatically causes engine shutdown

H60-C30

Improve engine diagnostics and improve cueing of correlation of PCL handle to engine

H60-C31

Accelerate addressing materiel failures

Materiel

High

H60-C32

Improve crew's ability to for premission planning by

Materiel

Medium

implementing electronic data management from Air
Warrior
H60-C33

Enforce rules through leadership commitment

Ldr Dev

VLow

H60-C34

Digital Source Collector (DSC) and envelope cueing

Materiel

High

Doctrine

Nil

Materiel

Low

Training

Low

Org

VLow

Ldr Dev

Low

(exceedences) and notice to pilot of exceedences/crew
monitor
H60-C35

Increase minimum distance between aircraft for multiship operations

H60-C36

Modify manual to establish method of calculating lateral CG

H60-C37

DAIG evaluate all institutional training schools for integration of risk management training into curriculum.

H60-C38

Establish or enforce selection criteria for advanced aviator training

H60-C40

Develop a standardized methodology for conducting
mission risk assessments with the objective for identification of all hazards and associated controls to be
presented in the mission brief

C-23

CONTROL

CONTROL STATEMENT

DTLOMS

COST

H60-C41

Evaluate system specific instruction in the UH-60 IP

Training

Low

Ldr Dev

Low

Ldr Dev

Low

Materiel

Low

Org

N/A

Materiel

Low

course. Emphasize what system specific instruction is
imparted by IP's to other aviators during assignments
(effectiveness is N/A)
H60-C42

Expand leader development training to emphasize
enforcement of aviation maintenance and operations
standards (integration into advanced course, an exportable training package, and modifying BOC and
AOC)

H60-C43

Integrate risk management training into aviation officer/WO/NCO development programs (use accident
experience as part of the training)

H60-C44

Install Flight Data Recorders (FDRs) and develop procedures for use of FDR data by commanders for aircrew training

H60-C45

Evaluate H-60 maintenance force structure (effectiveness is N/A)

H60-C46

Investigate improving H-60 handling qualities by implementing strakes to improve airflow over the tailboom (N/A effectiveness)

H60-C47

Develop a smooth deflection device on top of ALQ-144

Materiel

Low

H60-C48

Relocate /redesign ALQ-144 (substitute ATIRCMS)

Materiel

Low

H60-C49

Develop and distribute an exportable training package

Training

Low

for unit level Aviation refuelers and mandate training
requirement prior to assignment as aviation refueler
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